Congress /BJP ebong tader niti:

Congress r BJP ----Burjaya vhuswami srenir dui prodhan rajnoitikdaler sreni nitite , athik nitite ,amerika priti te,kono ved nei. Dui dal IMF -World Bank nirdeshito kathamo mene cholte agrohi. Sei jonyo ei dui dal besorkarikoron, bilognikaran, udrikoron nitir ghor somorthok. 1991 sale P.V.Naroshima Rao jokhon prodhan montri tokhon congress udar arthik nitir rupayon suru kore, r tik tokhon BJP neta Atal Bihari Bajpeyi ovijog korechilen je congress naki tader arthik niti churi korechilen. Amder bortoman PM tokhon Naroshima Rao er montri sovai orthomantri chilen. Pore NDA jokhon khomotai ase tokhon BJP, CONGRESS anushrito niti gulo sundor bhabe egiye niye chole. R tik tokhon thekei bamponthi ra oi udarikoroner birudhhe rukhe dariyechilo. 1991 sal theke bamponthira noya udar arthik niti, kathamomo punorbinayes name besorkarikoron , bilognikaran o udarikoroner birudhhe lagatar andolon kore jachhe.

Samarjyobad niti o kousaler kache Kendriosorkarer ei noti swikarer birudhhe somosto deshopremik , ganotantrik dhromyoniropekhya shakti ke ekjot kore andolon gore tolar lagatar prochesta bamponthira kore jachhe.

Tar fal swarup goto upa sorkarer udar orthonitir jok, bank ebong bima besorkarikoron,biloginikor, pesion bill, shromo ain yetadi atke diyeche.malikder sartho rekhe shromo ain korte giyechilo congressi sorkar bamera tar chrom birdshot kore at atke dei. Kichu sokari sonsthyar besorkarkoron o share bikri r opchesta korechilo congress tao bamera atkate pereche. Ekhon congress er natun niti choice markin provu der tusto kora, sei monobhab thekei tara moarkin rononitir onshidar hote cheye basto hoye poreche, jemon NDA cheyechilo markin desher junior partner hote. Tar jobab NDA sorkar peyechilo goto loksobha vote here giye kintu ei sob dekhe congressi der sikhya hoi ni tarao NDA r pothe egochhe, egochhe desh take benche dewar pothe, asa kora jai desher jonogan congressi der sikhya debe voter baske.

Ek je chilo konya

Uni vote here giye bolen scientific rigging .
Uni policer OC r chair dokol kore bolen besh korechi.
Uni rate swapno dekhen je uni rajyer mukhyo montri.
Uni sokale uthe onar bhaider bar khaiye writers building
Dokhol korte pathan.
Uni protibad koren bus trum puriye, elakar rasta ghat kete.
Uni protibad koren policer samne niriho mohilader pathiye.
Uni gan koren, uni kagoje anki buki aken lokke bolen tini naki silpi.
Uni bolen nobel churi hoi ni ota cpim niye niyeche.
Uni golai dori dite chan.
Uni kothai kothai podotayg koren.
Uni dukhya pele mediar samne kaden.
Uni rege gele table chapre venge felte chan.
Uni jibone acidic bar lath khan.
Uni Jader kache lath khan tader niye jot cum ghot koren.
Uni beder meye jostnya.( onar rajniotic guru r dewa tokma)
Uni saper gale chumu khan, khan banger gale chum.
Uni NDA ke charen na abar congress r sathe nichu tolai jot koren.
Uni je kono unnyonmulok kaje na koren.
Uni nijer dale konodin vote hote den na.
Uni sada kapor r hawai choppol pore ac gari chara choren na.

Boun to uni key??? Parle bina poisai nandigram ghuriye ana hobe.

mamata ba intellectuals ra chup keno?

singur e baire theke jara kaj korte esechhe tader chole jaoar humki diyechhe tmc er lokera.

eta unconsitutional, fascism.

mamata ba intellectuals ra chup keno?


taslima ke tarano niye chitkar hoy, raj thakarey bolle chitkar hoy ekhan chup keno?
eta to freedom of rights er violation.

Desh ke bandhok rakche kendriyo Sorkar.

EX Markin Congress er Protirakhya Upodesta Mr. Subrata Ghosh Roy er ovimot holo " Desh ke bandhk rekhe chukti korte choleche bharot." tar ovimot amader deshe je paromanobik chulli gulo ache tate vari jal projukti use kora hoye thake kintu us r sathe chukti hole ora amader ke debe halka jal projukti nirvor paromanobik chulli. sudhu tai noi amader jabotio ostro soronjam kenar jonyyo nirvor kore thakte hobe NSG vukto 45 ti desher opre. aro mojr kotha oi je samorik equipment gulo ora amader bechbe seta r kono spare parts porjonto amra amader deshe banate parbo na.

For more:

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/27/cache/172709.jpg

Punji o Rajyo Sorkar -II

arekti bapare proshno tola hochhe, amader rajyo sorkar keno bar bar punji biniyogkarider ei rajye tene anar bapare dourodouri korchen??? jara asben tara to nijer agrohei asben. rajyo sorkarer torofe tader eto sujog subidha dewar ki dorkar ache??

besorkari biniyog jokhon prodhan ebong jokhon lisence babostya uthe geche tokhon biniyog akorshoner jonyo rajyogulir modhye protijogita suru hoyeche, eke aswikar kora jabe na, rajyo gulo biniyog karider nana arthik subidha dewar niti ghosona koreche. punjir probonota sob somoi besi munafa orjonyer dike. tara artho -vougalik, porikathamo,bajar etc nana dike bibechona korei biniyoger sidhanto grohon kore. sutoranj rajyo sorkar jodi biniyog niye asar khetre kono agroho na dekhai, nischit babhei biniyog tokhon ei rajye asbe na. jeta amader kache bastob mone hoi ni. sutorang jodi amra jodi rajye silpe biniyog chai, tahole biniyog jate ase tar jonyo rajyo sorkarer udoyg thaka chai.

Hai!!! Birodhi Netri.

ajker anondo bajar potrikar ekti khabar sobai nischoi porechen, tate lekha hoyeche Proshasok momotar sathe baithak korte chan silpomantri Nirupom Sen, karon south 24 porgona ebong purbo midnapurer jela porishod ekhon trinomuler r eikhane royeche ekgada sorkari prokolpyo , jemon kukrahati -raychak setu, usti theke raychak ebong usti theke namkhana sorok prokolpyo, aro jemon nayachore petro rosayon silpo taluk, badur kache jahaj nirman silpo sathe govir samudre bondor prkolpya, ei sob jaigai silpo korte gele jomo adhigrohon ekta boro smosya r ei kaje birodhi dal jodi sohayota na kore se khetre khoti hobe rajyer. ekdike jemon natun silpo gore uthbe na temni kormosonsthan o bahot hobe. r ei je sorok porikolpona gulo ache ete sadharon manusher osesh subidhai hobe na sathe oi proklopye kaj pabe oi elakar khete khawa manush. othocho dekhun didi sorasori mantrir ei prostab nakoch kore diyeche sei singur karkhanar dohai diye. uni je ekjon gothonmulok birodhi netri non abar ta proman korlen. onar rajyer unnati niye adoui kono chinta ache janar ichha roilo???

CPIM o bideshi punji!!!

Jara bolche CPIM ekhon bideshi punjir dalal hoye geche tader jonyo ei thread, amader party kormosuchi te bedeshi punji biniyoger khetre tinti sorto arop kora hoyeche.

01. je bedishi punji ekhane biniyog hobe ta amader desher silper projukti ke unnoto korte sahajyo korbe.jate amra sei projukti ke awywta korte pari.
02.amader desher ponyer utpadon khomota ke bridhi korte hobe.
03.ei punji biniyog o utpadon khomota bridhi amader desher kormosonsthyan bridhir sohayok hobe.

ei tinti sorto mene kono bidshi punji ele amra tar birodh korbo na. kintu jokhon bideshi punji banking ba ins. segment or kichu strategic secotor e jokhon biniyog hochhe ja amader orthanaitik sarbovoumottake biponnyo kore tuleche, amra tokhon tar birodhita korchi.

aro kichu khetre amader bideshi biniyoge apotti ache, jemon krishikhetre bij,sar ba krishijomi ke ghire bohujatik corporate ra je babsya korte chaiche amra tar birodhi.

Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal

marxistindia
news from the cpi(m)
Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal

P. K. Iyengar
Chairman (Retd.), Atomic Energy Commission

In spite of the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest, many in the country, and in Parliament, support it because of misconceptions about the deal, which need to be clarified.

(1) The nuclear deal is an agreement between India and the US for the US government to supply nuclear fuel and reactors to India.

Contrary to common perception, the nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement is not a commitment on the part of the US government to provide us with uranium or nuclear reactors. Presently American law prohibits nuclear cooperation with India because we have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All the nuclear deal does is to grant a 'waiver' from that law, so that American companies can now pursue nuclear trade with India. However, if India conducts a test at any time, the waiver is revoked.

(2) Imported uranium and nuclear reactors will be cheap and cost-effective.

Even if the nuclear deal is made operational, the actual sale of uranium and nuclear reactors will be governed by market forces - there are no guarantees of cheap or competitive nuclear power. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it will be expensive. The cost of uranium in the international market has gone up four-fold in the last few years, and will rise further with further demand. The same is true of the cost of steel and other materials used in a reactor. Manpower costs are much higher in the West. The example of the Dhabol power plant has already shown us that importing power plants from the West is not necessarily a viable option. We would do well to learn from that experience.

(3) The nuclear deal will safeguard our energy security.

It is true that nuclear energy is green energy, and therefore essential for our long-term energy security. But this does not translate into the nuclear deal will ensure our energy security. Power from the nuclear reactors that we buy will definitely be more expensive than indigenous nuclear power. Further, to keep the reactors running, we will always be dependent on imported uranium, which is controlled by a cartel - the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore, the nuclear deal, by making us dependent on the cartel, will only compromise our energy security. Only our indigenous nuclear power programme can truly ensure our energy security. And in any case, for the next few decades, nuclear power will not exceed 6% of our total electricity production.

(4) Importing nuclear plants is a quick-fix solution to the present power crisis.

Nuclear technology is sensitive. Even if the nuclear deal goes through, it will take time to buy and setup new reactors. We have examples of the French reactors in China, and the Russian reactors in Kudankulam, India. It will actually take longer to setup foreign reactors compared to indigenous ones. Just the negotiations and legal formalities could take years. It will be at least eight years before we see the first power. So importing reactors is certainly no quick solution. For the short term, we will still have to rely on coal and hydroelectricity.


(5) The nuclear deal does not stop India from further nuclear testing, and therefore does not compromise our national security.

It is very clearly stated in the 123 Agreement it will be subject to national laws, and the Hyde Act is a law of the US. Therefore, the 123 Agreement is certainly circumscribed by the Hyde Act, which very clearly states that if India tests a nuclear device, all further nuclear trade is to stop, and the nuclear materials that have already been sold to us have to be returned. No future Indian government would dare to jeopardise such a huge investment in nuclear power, by testing. So, for all practical purposes the nuclear deal caps our strategic programme - which is precisely what the Americans intend.

(6) We can pass a national law to counteract the Hyde Act, and this will protect our strategic programme.

Just as the Hyde Act is not binding on us, our laws are not binding on the US. We can certainly amend our Atomic Energy Act to enable participation of the private sector in nuclear power. But if we pass a law saying that we will retain the right to test, it will have no influence on the actions of the US. If and when we test, they can simply quote the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act, and pull out all their nuclear materials, leaving us devastated. The only option here is to renegotiate the 123 Agreement and have the clause inserted there. However, the Americans are unlikely to agree to this, since it goes against their non-proliferation policy.

(7) The nuclear deal and the safeguards agreement give India the status of a nuclear power.

While the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement did indeed talk about India being treated as an equal by the US, neither the 123 Agreement nor the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, have borne out those optimistic statements. In fact, the IAEA safeguards agreement that has been negotiated is closely based on the model agreement that IAEA has for non-nuclear weapon states. The safeguards agreements that the nuclear weapon countries have signed with the IAEA require them to put very few reactors under safeguards, and allow them to take reactors out of safeguards. India, however, will have to place most of its reactors under safeguards for perpetuity. Therefore we are certainly not being treated as a nuclear weapons country.

(8) Without the nuclear deal, we cannot get adequate uranium for our domestic nuclear programme.

The Department of Atomic Energy has always maintained that we have enough indigenous uranium for 10,000 MW of nuclear power for 30 years. We are not yet close to that number. The present mismatch in uranium availability for operating reactors is a consequence of poor planning, and inadequate prospecting and mining. There is talk of importing 40,000 MW of nuclear power, which will cost not less than $100 billion or Rs. 4 lakh crores. If even 10% of this money were spent on uranium mining in existing mines in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, on searching for new uranium deposits, and negotiating with non-NSG countries, there will be enough uranium for a robust indigenous nuclear power programme, until such time as thorium reactors takes over.


(9) The safeguards agreement with the IAEA guarantees fuel supplies even if India conducts a nuclear test.

The safeguards agreement only notes, in the preamble, that India's concurrence to the safeguards is linked to getting fuel supplies. However, the IAEA has no role in this matter, and certainly, no such commitment is given in the safeguards agreement. It also notes that India may take 'corrective measures' in the event of a disruption of foreign fuel supplies. It does not specify what these measures will be, it does not provide for any role for the IAEA in this, and it does not bestow legitimacy on any such measures that India may take. It may well be that any such measures that we suggest, such as importing fuel from another country, will be disallowed by the nuclear cartel (the NSG). The only tangible corrective measure is for India to explore and mine more uranium, and to enhance the enrichment capability to provide fuel for those reactors. The latter is subject to uncertainty.

(10) The nuclear deal has no impact on our foreign policy.

The Hyde Act states clearly that it is the policy of the US to secure India's cooperation on a number of issues involving Iran, including its capability to reprocess nuclear fuel (in spite of the fact that Iran, as an NPT signatory, has the right to enrich uranium for use in light-water reactors). This has nothing to do with the nuclear deal, and can only be related to influencing our foreign policy. Recent statements by Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, regarding Indo-Iran gas pipeline, only add fuel to such suspicions.

It can therefore be seen, that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest. It presents the very serious danger of capping our strategic programme. That alone is reason enough not to go forward with the deal. Additionally, it does not guarantee the energy security that we are seeking, and, in fact, may only end up making us as vulnerable to the nuclear cartel, as we are today to the oil cartel.

It is easy to see why the US wants this deal so badly. At virtually no cost, since there is no commitment towards fuel supplies, they can cap our strategic programme, bring us into the NPT net, through the back door, as a non-nuclear power, keep a close eye on our nuclear activities, including R&D, through intrusive IAEA inspections, and subjugate us to the wishes of the nuclear cartel. If there were no cartel, we could have easily extended the Kudankulam agreement for more reactors, and avoided the present situation. If these are not reasons enough not to go ahead with the nuclear deal, then there are no reasons that reason can find.

US/Indo Nuclear Agreement: Derailing A Deal

08 August, 2007 -- Nuclear-armed states are criminal states. They have a legal obligation, confirmed by the World Court, to live up to Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which calls on them to carry out good-faith negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. None of the nuclear states has lived up to it. The United States is a leading violator, especially the Bush administration, which even has stated that it isn't subject to Article 6.

On July 27, Washington entered into an agreement with India that guts the central part of the NPT, though there remains substantial opposition in both countries. India, like Israel and Pakistan (but unlike Iran), is not an NPT signatory, and has developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty. With this new agreement, the Bush administration effectively endorses and facilitates this outlaw behaviour. The agreement violates US law, and bypasses the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 45 nations that have established strict rules to lessen the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Â

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, observes that the agreement doesn't bar further Indian nuclear testing and, "incredibly, ... commits Washington to help New Delhi secure fuel supplies from other countries even if India resumes testing." It also permits India to "free up its limited domestic supplies for bomb production." All these steps are in direct violation of international nonproliferation agreements.

Â

The Indo-US agreement is likely to prompt others to break the rules as well. Pakistan is reported to be building a plutonium production reactor for nuclear weapons, apparently beginning a more advanced phase of weapons design. Israel, the regional nuclear superpower, has been lobbying Congress for privileges similar to India's, and has approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group with requests for exemption from its rules. Now France, Russia and Australia have moved to pursue nuclear deals with India, as China has with Pakistan - hardly a surprise, once the global superpower has opened the door.

Â

The Indo-US deal mixes military and commercial motives. Nuclear weapons specialist Gary Milhollin noted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's testimony to Congress that the agreement was "crafted with the private sector firmly in mind," particularly aircraft and reactors and, Milhollin stresses, military aircraft. By undermining the barriers against nuclear war, he adds, the agreement not only increases regional tensions but also "may hasten the day when a nuclear explosion destroys an American city." Washington's message is that "export controls are less important to the United States than money" - that is, profits for US corporations - whatever the potential threat. Kimball points out that the United States is granting India "terms of nuclear trade more favourable than those for states that have assumed all the obligations and responsibilities" of the NPT. In most of the world, few can fail to see the cynicism. Washington rewards allies and clients that ignore the NPT rules entirely, while threatening war against Iran, which is not known to have violated the NPT, despite extreme provocation: The United States has occupied two of Iran's neighbours and openly sought to overthrow the Iranian regime since it broke free of US control in 1979.

Â

Over the past few years, India and Pakistan have made strides towards easing the tensions between the two countries. People-to-people contacts have increased and the governments are in discussion over the many outstanding issues that divide the two states. Those promising developments may well be reversed by the Indo-US nuclear deal. One of the means to build confidence throughout the region was the creation of a natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan into India. The "peace pipeline" would have tied the region together and opened the possibilities for further peaceful integration.

Â

The pipeline, and the hope it offers, might become a casualty of the Indo-US agreement, which Washington sees as a measure to isolate its Iranian enemy by offering India nuclear power in exchange for Iranian gas - though in fact India would gain only a fraction of what Iran could provide.

Â

The Indo-US deal continues the pattern of Washington's taking every measure to isolate Iran. In 2006, the US Congress passed the Hyde Act, which specifically demanded that the US government "secure India's full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction."

Â

It is noteworthy that the great majority of Americans - and Iranians - favour converting the entire region to a nuclear-weapons free zone, including Iran and Israel. One may also recall that UN Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, to which Washington regularly appealed when seeking justification for its invasion of Iraq, calls for "establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery."

Â

Clearly, ways to mitigate current crises aren't lacking.

Â

This Indo-US agreement richly deserves to be derailed. The threat of nuclear war is extremely serious, and growing, and part of the reason is that the nuclear states - led by the United States - simply refuse to live up to their obligations or are significantly violating them, this latest effort being another step toward disaster.

Â

The US Congress gets a chance to weigh in on this deal after the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group vet it. Perhaps Congress, reflecting a citizenry fed up with nuclear gamesmanship, can reject the agreement. A better way to go forward is to pursue the need for global nuclear disarmament, recognising that the very survival of the species is at stake.

US/Indo Nuclear Agreement: Derailing A Deal

October 09, 2007 By Noam Chomsky

Sources:http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/14261

Lal Sallam.

But the victory comes with a tarnished tag. Corruption may be a routine affair for Indians, but what the country witnessed these last few days crossed all limits of decorum. To get the numbers right, most parties, barring the Left and a handful of others , resorted to dishonourable ways.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/23upavote3.htm

bampothira bikri hoye jai na, nitir sathe aposh kore na, abar ta promanito holo.


nije ekjon bamponthi bole ajj khub bhalo lagche.

Kara Subidhabadi????

UP te samprodayik shaktir birodhitar disha dekhyechilo SP ajj tara tader oi bhavmurty nijerai nosto korche. je SP borabor N deal er birodhita kore gelo tarai kono jadu montre hothat N deal ke bhalo chokhe dekhte suru korlo??? bokar moton SP neta charidike bole berachhen N deal niye desher kono bipod nei, mushalmander kono bipod nei, mushalman der naki jeta bipod seta holo BJP. othocho etai lokhyanio SP adhvanir pothei bharot matkin jot chaichen.

r amader poschimbonger birodhi netri ki korchen?? mukhe bolchen uni naki BJP ebong Congress theke somo durawta niti niye cholchen othocho mojar kotha holo uni kintu NDA ekhono charen ni. goto kal star anonder ekti anusthane ese tmc ek neta (sougata roy) poriskar bole dilen onara desher rajniti/sartha niye motei chintito non.onader lakhya holo writers theke Budhha babu ke sorano. koto subidhabaj amader ei birodhi ra jekhane desh ta bikri hoye jawar jogar sekhane amader birodhi netri oi sob na dekhe ba shune poschim bonge komotai asar diba swapno dekhchen.

R amader kendrio sorkar ba congressi ra to mukhe sob tik ache bole puro rat jege katachhe ki vave 271 ta vote jogar kora jai tar chinta kore. JMM ke oti koste kinte pereche tara kintu tar bodole JMM ja dabi korche Dr.Sing ta kotota rakhte parbe ta niye probol sondeho theke jachhe.JMM caiche koila montrok jeta sibu soren ke dite amader prime min. anichhuk. sudhu tai noi 5 koti takar ekta package o cheyechen guruji. jeta naki rajyer unnatir(!!!!) sarthe khorcha kora hobe, ekhaneo sesh noi amader rajyer o biharer kichuta uni niye nite chan aro brihottoro jharkhand rajyo banaor jonyo.

edike N deal niye amader kendriyo sorkar jokhon basto tokhon bivvinyo rajyo theke tathyer vittite kendriyo krishi montrok krishok der antmohatyar je porisonkhyan tairy koreche ta otontyo bedonadayok. ei muhurte sara desher modhye krishokder antmyohatyar porisonkhyai karnatak sob cheye egiye , unfortunately jekhane sashok sreni holo bjp. goto 6 bochore karnatoke 8,600 krishok antmyohata korechen.tarpore ache andhraprodesh sekhane mara gechen pray 2000 jon r tritio sthane ache moharastro sekhane 2001 theke 06 sale mara geche 891 jon krishok. pasapasi besorkari sutre jana geche bidhorve goto choi mase antmyogathi hoyeche pray 600 jon krishok. ei number guli ki amader PM ektu chok buliye dekhechen??? uttor holo na , karon uni je ekhon different number game niye basto onar priyo number ekhon holo 271, jeta ke pawar jonyo uni lorchen, namiyediyechen boro boro corporate der, ekoda onar tibro somolachona kaki Amar singh ke. dhikkar janai ei sorkar ke jara desher manusher kotha vule giye bairer desher chamcha hote uthe pore legeche.

Keno N deal r birodhita???

4O bochorer chuktite amara pormanu bidyut pabo matro 4%. sundor bisleshon korechen kolkata biswabidyaloyer rosayoner adhyapok Shyamal Chakroborty.

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/16/cache/171384.jpg

U 238 ke plutonium 239 kora jai. tarpore thorium 232 ke plutonium theke berono kona diye dhakka mere U 233 kora jai. ei U 233 r jalani gun U 235 er theke onek besi. BARC er bigyani ra ei kaj onek gutiye enechen tao????

Pormanu chukti niye birodhita keno???

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/18/cache/171627.jpg

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/17/cache/171541.jpg

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/16/cache/171470.jpg

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/15/cache/171337.jpg

Pormanu chukti niye birodhita keno???

jekhane sara biswa pormanu biduyt theke sore asche sekhane amader desh eto poromanu biduyt niye matamati korche?? prosho tulechen Saha Instituter bigyani Prof. Raj Kumar Maitra.

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/17/cache/171559.jpg

Left Stand on the Nuclear Deal

The Left Parties believe that the entire material placed before the UPA-Left Committee on the nuclear deal should be made public since the Indo-US nuclear deal is of vital importance and will have long term implications for the country. The struggle waged by all patriotic and democratic forces against the deal finds reflection in the document submitted by the Left Parties. They are an effective and comprehensive critique of the deal and its harmful consequences for India’s national interests, foreign policy and strategic autonomy.

The UPA-Left Committee on the Indo-US nuclear deal was set up after the Left Parties came out in opposition to the 123 Agreement signed with the United States of America in end July 2007.

The Left Parties, after studying the text of the 123 bilateral agreement came out with their stand on August 7, 2007. The statement is reproduced in this publication.

Subsequently, the UPA and the Left Parties decided that a committee be set up to go into the objections raised by the Left Parties. The Committee was asked to:

* look into certain aspects of the bilateral agreement;
* the implications of the Hyde Act on the 123 Agreement and self-reliance in the nuclear sector;
* the implications of the nuclear agreement on foreign policy and security cooperation.

for more:http://www.pragoti.org/node/1647

"We Must Clearly Spell Out

"We Must Clearly Spell Out

Our Policy Of Land Acquisition

& Rehabilitation"




West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee recently spoke to Ganashakti on a variety of developmental issues that are reflected in the policies of the Left Front government. During the course of the interview given on the occasion of Left Front government completing 31 years in office, Buddhadeb also commented on the Darjeeling developments.

Special successes

The focal point of success of the Bengal Left Front government is the regime of redistributive land reforms because of which the rural poor is in possession of land parcels of varying sizes. The success has been achieved through a series of hard struggles and not merely through administrative regulations. The work of the administration also comprised the physical transfer of land rights in the shape of patta deeds to the rural poor and the landless.


Around 84 per cent of the total mass of agricultural land (amounting to 1.35 crore acres) is in the hands of the rural poor. There has also been the setting up and the running of panchayati raj institutions. The panchayats could be organised and run by the rural people because the land belongs to them now. This has in turn influenced the great success we have had in agricultural production. We lead the country in terms of producing rice, jute, potato, vegetables, fruits, flowers etc.

On the opposition to industrialisation


We gave a slogan that we shall consolidate our successes in agriculture and on that foundation shall build up industries. This was done as part of the pre-election call in 2006. Certainly, the people had agreed to the implicational content of the slogan that we raised. Nevertheless, the transition was never an easy task. We frankly expected opposition to be forthcoming as a compulsion from those whose land would be transferred. Thus, the task now is that we clear up further the issues affecting land acquisition and rehabilitation.


Consensus on the issue of development


The task of land reforms and transfer of land to the kisans and the rural poor was certainly done based on the widest possible consensus. The consensus was available because the programme was of anti-zamindar character and was also an exercise in democracy. However, on the issue of private capital that is connected with the process of industrialisation (we do not have any viable alternative to this) a confusion has been created amongst the ranks of the opposition parties, the LF constituents, and even amongst a section of the mass of the people.


At the same time, there is consensus in that everybody would say that they, too, would like to welcome industrialisation, and that they do not stand opposed to it. The debate is principally built up around the mode and method adopted. We have to reach a consensus here through discussion. We are fully seized of the indecision that the LF constituents are affected by on the question of private capital, big capital, and capital of the MNCs.


On the confusion among the poor


The orientation and direction of every programme of the LF government is towards the welfare of the working people who are poor. This is our major difference with other state governments. We have always held that the Left alternatives of the Left Front government comprise:


*Land reforms, panchayati institutions etc.
*Industrialisation aimed at increase of employment, with emphasis on the manufacturing sector and on the small and middle-level industries.
*Total literacy, total health, self-help groups, social security especially for unorganised workers etc.


These are the directions of our programmes. It is true nonetheless that despite all this, we are not able to reach out to every section of the poor. The state government, the panchayati raj bodies, the municipalities, and especially the Party must specially look to this on a basis of urgency.


On the reduction of mass support


We are presently in the midst of going about a comprehensive review of the results of the rural polls. The preliminary review has revealed that there are several common reasons why our support was eroded where it did. These include, for example, weaknesses of the Party and the mass organisations, the disunity amongst LF constituent partners, the weakness of our campaign against the propaganda of the opposition, and above all, the spread of a baseless fear on the issue of land acquisition. We have to discuss thoroughly all these issues before fixing our next steps.


Darjeeling issue


We have to proceed with great caution and patience in dealing with the Darjeeling problem for the issue is very sensitive and is also connected with the question of nationality. A political solution must be found through discussions. We can and shall remain, solidly bonded together - the people of the hills and the people of the plains.


The basic pre-condition of development is peace and amity. The avenues of discussion with the leadership of the Darjeeling agitation must be kept open. We have kept the union government aware of the issue on behalf of the state LF government. The resolution of the issue, as we have said, must be forthcoming through an amicable discourse.

Matongini Mohila Somiti na onyo kichu????

ei koyekdin agei bidhansovate amader CM bolechen je matongini mohila somitir modhye maobadi ra achen r ekhono nandigrame trinomul maobadider sathe hate hat miliye kaj korche. jodio ei kotha sune bidhan sobha theke tmc r bidhayok ra sobai walk out koren abar dekha jachhe sei jadavpur university er meyeguli jader maobadi sondehe dhora hoyechilo tara bolche je tara dirghodin nandigrame chilo r jokhon police oi meye gulor room search korte jai tokhon sekhane oder bachate joro hoyechilo tmc r lokjan. abar dekha jachhe kolkata tv o sekhane hajir hoye tader garite kore oi meye gulo ke niye policer samne theke chompot dei, mojar kotha nandigrame ei kolkata tv maonadi tmc joter hoye daru bhave prochar porbo chaliyechilo. ei sob dekhe dui dui char kore nite r ki kono asubidha ache???

arekta inish dekehe obak lagche je meyegulo dirghodin nandigrame giye pore thake tara ki kore final exam e boste pare??? karon jotodur jani classe upsthithir har dekhei kintu exam e boste dewa hoi. na ei khetreo tader dorodi prof. kull tader dike hat bariye dey.

Mudslinging, deals overshadow confidence vote

Unheard of political alliances. Accusations of vote-buying to the tune of more than $6 million an MP. Criticisms of shady corporate lobbying with one of the world's richest men.

With the fate of the government dependent on a confidence vote on Tuesday, mudslinging and deal-making are in full swing and even sullying the relatively clean image of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Singh, a soft-spoken former finance minister, was forced to call a confidence vote after his communist allies withdrew their support for the government to protest a civilian nuclear deal with the United States.

Singh believes he will survive the vote after securing support of the regional Samajwadi Party. The vote is essentially between a ruling Congress party coalition and the Hindu nationalist-led opposition and the communists.

If the government loses the vote, early elections will be called, probably this year. It will lead to political uncertainty just as the government battles rising inflation and interest rates, as well signs of fiscal strains and economic slowdown.

"The prime minister expressed confidence that the people of India understood the significance of the initiatives being taken by the UPA government and endorse them," according to a statement by the prime minister's office late on Tuesday.

The vote will likely hang on a score of votes, mainly from smaller parties and independents, in the 543-member parliament.

So close is the vote, parties from all sides have stepped up their battles and rhetoric to secure votes.

"The government will not survive the trust vote even when it's indulging in large-scale horse trading," Vijay Kumar Malhotra, a senior leader of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, told the Indian Express.

He estimated the government only had 250 votes of the 272 needed for a majority.

The communists, angry at what they see as the government's betrayal over a nuclear deal they say makes India a pawn of Washington, announced an alliance with Mayawati, the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, over the confidence vote.

It was an unheard of alliance and a sign of high stakes of the vote. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) and Mayawati, one of India's best known politicians, have been enemies for years.

The government's own alliance with Samajwadi has sparked criticism the prime minister was allowing his government to bend to its conditions, from judicial probes into political enemies of the party to helping corporate allies of the regional party.

The timing of news that the CBI could probe Mayawati, raised criticism of an under-the-table deal. Mayawati is the main political enemy of the Samajwadi.

The communists also sparked a storm with accusations that MPs were being bribed for their support.

A.B. Bardhan, head of the Communist Party of India, said the going rate was around $6 million to guarantee a vote. He produced no evidence, although India has seen a string of scandals in recent years when MPs have accepted bribes to change sides.

The prime minister sparked more criticism for meeting with one of the feuding billionaire Ambani brothers, whose businesses make up about 5 percent of the Asian giant's economic output.

Samajwadi's leader Amar Singh has close links to Anil Ambani, the head of Reliance Communications, who has been in a long dispute with his even richer and elder brother Mukesh, chairman of Reliance Industries.

So when Mukesh Ambani met the prime minister on Monday, it sparked headlines that he was trying to defend his business interests amid fears his brother now enjoyed greater access to the government thanks to his SP links.

The meeting followed Amar Singh saying his party would push for a windfall tax on private oil refiners, a move that would directly hurt Mukesh's business.

"The new found friendship with the likes of Amar Singh ... the sudden entry of corporate bosses in the picture have clouded the image of probity which the prime minister has assiduously built up over the years," the Asian Age said in an editorial.

Sources:

http://in.news.yahoo.com/137/20080716/736/tnl-mudslinging-deals-overshadow-confide.html

NATIONAL INTERESTS ABANDONED,CENTRE LOYAL TO U.S : BIMAN BOSE IN LONDON

Withdrawal of the left parties has come as a result of the indifference of the U.P.A government towards the interests of the country.

These words came from the veteran Mr.biman bose,secretary, C.P.I.M state committee at a convention arranged at the asian centre in London,this sunday.Bose will be attending a number of conventions regarding education and some other subjects as well.Here,at the convention arranged by the communist association of Great Britain and the Indian workers association of Great Britain, he discussed about the contemporary political scenario in india.After his discusion he answered a number of questions on the political situation in India and West Bengal,experiences of the state government,its take and steps on industrialization and education and finally its role in the economic development of the state.A large number of N.R.I s were present at the gathering.

According to the communist leader " we forbade them from the beginning to proceed towards the nuclear deal overlooking the national interests and harming the independent foreign policy.but they did'nt listen.we have emphasized to avoid neglecting common interests,and to check the rise in prices of essential commodities.But perhaps the UPA is more keen in getting enlisted to the US goodbook.For these reasons the communists have withdrawn their support from this hopeless government."

Mr. Aftab Saddique,president,communist association of Great Britain and Mr. Hershed Bent,general secretary,Indian workers' association of Great Britain also shared their views.Dr Sunil Bhaduri presided over the convention.

Mr.Biman Bose recalled the picture during the establishment of this government,the deficit of adequete number of seats,and the role of the left parties in bringing the UPA to power."The primary goal was to maintain religious harmony within the country,thwarting racial BJP.That never meant though ,that we wholeheartdly supported each and every steps of the UPA government.The Left Front has voiced its protests whenever the common interests were overlooked and has expressed its concern.On quite a number of such cases the UPA has been forced to retreat.",basu said.

He added, "We not only emphasized on removing racial discrimintion but also on taking care of the interests of the common people.

That is why a common minimum protocol was formed.But the UPA government was devaiting from this protocol and was taking multiple steps risking the the public interest.We responded with concern.But now admist this shameless US flattery of the UPA and its proceedings over the deal,we will be the last one to support them."

Many asked him the reason for staying 30 years of long period in government.He explained that the left front government is focussed at meeting the needs of the poor people ,more specifically common people."There are still a lot of things to be done.Percentage of people living below the poverty level has decreased.Caring about the interests of the poor,developing the infrastructure of education,and creating more and more employment opportunities-these are the main objectives of this government,just like it has always been.Maintaining the success in agriculture , we have stressed on its betterment.Over it rests the agenda of industrialisation.Unfortunately people are being misguided over this aspect.The oppositions are creating a false agenda and have formed an unethical front.We observed it during the Panchayat elections.Because of this false and baseless campaigning of the opposition at some parts people have been influenced and we have'nt fared well.But CPI(M) has taken necessary remedial measures and is very eager to gain back the faith and confidence of those people.The left front is too trying its part.

The left front is dedicated to work for the poor and needy.It will maintain its tradition",bose confirmed.

(Translated from ganashakti,13th july,an article by indrajit chakravorty

translated by Koustav Ghosal,2nd yr,SFI unit member,

Netaji Subhash Engineering College)

Maobadira alochonai bosuk!!!!

maobadider nisiddho korar kotha vavche na poschimbongo sorkar. goto 3 rd july bidhan sovai amader mukhyomantri sopsto kore diyechen maobadider nisiddho kora hochhe na , oder birudhhe lorai ta hobe rajnoitik vave. sobcheye mojar bapar holo prodhanmontrir sathe jatio surakya niye ekti meeting e amader desher onek rajyo mao badider beaini ghoshonar dabi tulechilo kintu poschim bango sorkar tate badha diyechilo. amader sorkarer ovimot chilo maobadider sathe lorai mane ekdike proshasonik babosthya onyodike arthosamajik unnoyaner kormosuchi pronoyon. nisiddho kore oder niyontron kora jai na.

mao e chobi, ba mao bad prochare leaflet rakha kono opradh hisebe gonyo hobe na e rajye. jesob mao badira khun, hatya, bisforon ,dakatir moton oporadhe jukto tader birudhhe sorkari ain anujayi babosthya nebe sorkar.

jodio sorkarer mao badider dike bhalobasar hat bariye dile ki hobe 2005 theke 2008 porjontyo maobadira ei rajye khun koreche 42 jon niriho manush ke.tader modhye besir vag CPIM somorthok r ekjon CPI somorthok. era eder otorkito akromone ahoto koreche pray 47 jon manush ke. er sathe ora 12 jon police kormi ke khun koreche.

sunirdisto oporadher vitiite amader rajye 314 mao badi jail e bandi achen.

amar mao badi bandhuder kache anurodh jokhon prosashon ekhat bariye dichhe tokon tomader ki ek hat barano jai na??? na sarajibon sei lal mere lal er khela cholbe???

nirlojjo birodhi!!!!

nirlojjo birodhita!!!

01.1 st july kolkatar medical coll e yubo congress r trinomuli ra militovave hangama chalai. sudhu tai noi haspataler joruri jinishpotro nosto kore dei, asbab potro londovondo kore dei, baire theke asa shoto shoto rugi eder lupen giri te bipode poren.

02.Singure tata ra gorib manusher chikitshar jonyo je camp ti khulechilo trinomulira sekhane khomotai asar pore sei camp ti tara bandho kore diyeche.

03.Bonyai ebare sobcheye khotigrosto hoyeche purbo midnapurer bistirno anchal, proshashon jokhon bonya durgoto manushder pase ese daranor chesta korche tokon dekha gelo tmc r netri ei bonya ke man made bonya akhya diye proshasoner sathe jotorokom vave oshojogita kora jai tar udahoron rekhe gelen.tar daler kormra eker por ek sorkari tran bontone badha diye gechen , sorkari tran loot korechen. bonya r jonyo jara gram chere tran shibire jete badhyo hoyechilen tara jodi cpim somorthok hon to tader grame firte badha diyechen.

voddrotya ba souyjanyo bodh bole jodi kichu thake ta ei sob birodhider songbidhane nei, obosoi eta ei dal gulir jonmobidhi sohojato bishoi. noile uttor 24 pgs, purbo midnapur ba hoogly te jela porishoder sovapoti ba soho sovapoti nirbachoner somoi je achar acroron korechen ta kono vodro loker hote paren na.

NREGA shines for Tripura women

The earthen road that connects Doctors Tilla area of Purba Barjala gram panchayat to Mandai main road in Jirania block of West Tripura district, constructed under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), was completed in August last year. The one kilometre long road has provided the villagers, mostly the womenfolk, immense satisfaction, not only because that they now need not walk a long distance to reach the market area, but because the construction of the road gave them an opportunity to earn.

The brick soling of the road is likely start in this year for which they are now eagerly waiting. The construction work involving a total cost of Rs.73,800 started on 15 July last year, generated 1230 person days in the village, and was completed within one and half months. For the women engaged in the work, mostly belonging to the Bengali community, this provided extra earnings for their families. In fact, ever since the NREGA schemes have been implemented in their locality, they have been able to augment their family income. The male folk of the village move to nearby towns in search of jobs, where they can earn between Rs.120 to Rs.150 per day on an average. Lack of job opportunities for women in the area has made them remain at home. In such a situation, the NREGA projects have provided relief.

If NREGA schemes are meant for enhancement of family income for women in Purba Barjala village, for the tribal women belonging to Tripuri tribe in Chargharia, a village under the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC), earning under NREGA project is crucial for their living. These landless tribals have no means of livelihood except depending on daily wage earnings in nearby town or in brick-making industries, which is not ensured everyday.

“There is no work available for women. The two kilometre road construction work under NREGA gave us the opportunity to work and earn something. But it was completed before the state assembly election. After the election, we are looking forward to more jobs under the scheme,” said Piranjay Debbarma, a senior woman of the village.

Be it for an increase in the family income or a crucial tool for living, Tripura engages a substantial number of women in NREGA projects as compared to other northeastern states. In some pockets like Jirania and Dukli blocks, participation of women in NREGA works is amazing. In Dukli Gram Sabha of Dukli Block, 10 km away from the capital city Agartala, percentage of women engaged in NREGA schemes has goes up to 70 to 80 per cent, says S R Choudhury, the Block Development Officer.

“This is because NREGA works fetch a relatively low wage – about Rs. 85 per day. Because of this, menfolk show little interest in these works. The daily wage, even for unskilled work, is much higher. For skilled jobs, the men get as much as Rs. 200 per day,” the BDO says.

The Minister for Rural Development, Jitendra Choudhury, while acknowledging that the high women participation in NREGA schemes is a very positive aspect, adds that as the left-front government of the state has been able to ensure substantial job opportunities for the male folk in rural pockets, women have come forward to take part in NREGA works. Also, the state has moved for multi-cropping agriculture practices instead of traditional single cropping, which also keeps the men busy in fields, giving women more opportunities to avail of NREGA facilities. In Tripura, in the non-tribal segment, the agriculture practice is an all-male activity.

Another reason is, perhaps, women feel safe at the work place in a better socio-economic environment, the minister adds. Stating that participation of women is highly encouraging he says that it would definitely give rural economy a boost in the near future.

Statistics say

In Khedarnal village of Amarpur block in North Tripura district, 100 person days have been generated for all the 321 families during 2007-08, under the NREGA implementation schemes. This is for the first time in the country that 100 person days were generated for all the families in a village selected for NREGA schemes. Altogether 32,100 person days were generated under the scheme during the year.

A state progress report of NREGA activities has recorded percentage of person days for women as 44.51, which is higher than the national average of 42.52. The state has the highest record so far in terms of employing women in NREGA projects amongst the northeastern states. In some of the major tribal states, percentage of employment for women are: Arunachal Pradesh - 29.58, Nagaland -29.36 and Mijoram – 36.62. In matrilineal Meghalaya, it is only 30.87 while Assam records 30.85 women employment and Manipur records 32.80.

The department of rural development records generation of person-days as 181.04 lakh, with creation of an average 38.86 person-days per family in 2007-08. The state recorded issuing of 4,65,779 job cards for the year 2007-08 in three districts including West Tripura, South Tripura and Dhalai. While Dhalai was the first to be selected for the NREGA projects in 2006-07, West and South Tripura were selected in 2007-08. The North district has been selected only in 2008-09, and works are yet to be implemented.

Percentage of person-days for scheduled tribes that constitute 31 per cent of the total population was 41.95 during the year. In Dhalai district, 76.03 person-days per family have been generated in 2007-08.

“Taking the Dhalai district experience, the first NREGA district in our state into account, we are expecting generation of more person-days in 2008-09 in West and South districts also. Normally it takes some time in planning during the first year. Implementation process shows good results only from the second year after selection of the district for NREGA scheme,” says Brijesh Pandey, secretary, rural development. Even in South district, the department could generate 100 person-days for 216 families in very first year of NREGA implementation, he says. The NREGA manual ensures 100 days job-guarantee to all families identified for NREGA schemes.

Aim to create permanent assets

One of the objectives of NREGA implementation projects in Tripura is creation of permanent assets by construction of road infrastructures. In Jirania Block for instance, out of the 33 NREGA projects for 2007-08, 14 were brick soling road construction projects.

The state records construction of 6,716 kilometres of road under NREGA projects in 2007-08. In Dhalai, another 962.66 kilometres have been constructed during that year. Justifying the major thrust on road construction, the minister says that while road construction is a permanent asset building process aimed at accelerating developmental activities at grassroots, the state government has set a target that every hamlet having a population of 250 will be covered with a blacktopping road within next two years.

“Ensuring person days is not the sole objective of Tripura model of NREGA implementation. Our thrust also rests on creation of permanent assets in the state”, Pandey says.

Apart from the road construction schemes, other projects that have a priority in NREGA schemes include water conservation and water harvesting, micro-irrigation works, renovation of traditional water-bodies, fisheries, land development, flood control and protection, culverts and RCC bridges.

Performance

In terms of performance of NREGA implementation, Tripura ranks second in the country. The record of other northeastern states as regards their performance: Mizoram – fifth in the country, Manipur – seventh, Assam – thirteenth, Meghalaya – eighteenth, Arunachal – nineteenth and Nagaland – twentieth. The ranking parameters include transparency, accountability, vigilance, monitoring, evaluation, physical performance indicator, financial performance indicator, staffing, training and others, according to NREGA guidelines.

http://www.indiatogether.org/2008/jun/wom-nrega.htm

Does the IAEA agreement hide us from the Hyde Act?

Various commentators have argued that the draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement gives India considerable leeway, denied it under the Hyde Act, in taking corrective action in case fuel supplies are interrupted. To be fair, unlike government spokespersons, some of these analysts concede that all imported reactors will remain permanently under safeguards. But one of the claims adduced by these non-official defenders in support of the Agreement is that India can unilaterally withdra w from IAEA safeguards its indigenous reactors that are made subject to the Agreement, provided all the imported fuel is taken out.

This curious conclusion flows from a wholly untenable reading of Article 29 of the Agreement, which states: “The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973).” Since the latter is a restricted document of the IAEA’s Board of Governors, these non-official analysts have speculated that with respect to termination of safeguards, the import of GOV/1621 into Article 29 has let non-supplied facilities off the hook, by requiring them to be under safeguards only as long as they use imported fuel! From this, they have jumped to the conclusion that therefore for such indigenous facilities, India does not even need to invoke its preambular ‘right’ to take “corrective measures.”

Nowhere does GOV/1621 provide the remotest sanction for any such interpretation. I happen to have the text of this restricted 1973 document. It originated from the urging of “a substantial number of Governors … that there should be a greater degree of standardisation than in the past with respect to the duration and termination of such agreements as may henceforth be concluded under the Agency’s Safeguards System … for the application of safeguards in connection with nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material supplied to States by third parties.”

Two concepts are clearly laid out in the IAEA document for these future agreements: (a) “the duration of the agreement should be related to the period of actual use of the items in the recipient State”; and (b) “the provisions for terminating the agreement should be formulated in such a way that the rights and obligations of the parties continue to apply in connection with supplied nuclear material and with special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material, until such time as the Agency has terminated the application of safeguards thereto...”

Further, by way of exposition of these concepts, the Annex to the document makes it clear that after termination, “the rights and obligations of the parties, as provided for in the agreement, would continue to apply in connection with any supplied material or items and with any special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with any supplied material or items which have been included in the inventory, until such material or items had been removed from the inventory” (emphasis added). The only way such “items or non-nuclear material could be removed from the purview of the agreement” is “if they had been consumed, were no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or had become practically irrecoverable.”

GOV/1621 ensures that all such materials “would be subject to safeguards until the Agency had terminated safeguards on that special fissionable and nuclear material in accordance with the provisions of the Agency’s Safeguards System. Thus, the actual termination of the operation of the provisions of the Agreement would take place only when everything had been removed from the inventory” (emphasis added).

The effect of GOV/1621, therefore, is to tighten and make more restrictive the application of IAEA safeguards to all supplied nuclear material, facilities, and items. But it is wholly fanciful to say that it empowers or even allows India to take non-supplied facilities made subject to the Agreement out of safeguards, if they no longer use supplied fuel.

For indigenous nuclear facilities that have been built without supplies from any third party, we have to consider two additional Articles of the Agreement. One is that “items” for safeguards are governed by Article 11(a), which defines items to include: “any facility listed in the Annex to this Agreement, as notified by India.” The second is Article 32, which explicitly states: “Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards” (emphasis added).

If we accept that Article 32 will come into play for taking facilities out of safeguards, there are three conditions that need to be fulfilled. First, both parties — India and the IAEA — need to agree to this; it is not a unilateral decision for India to make. Secondly, the facility must no longer be usable for any nuclear activity. Any facility that produces nuclear energy is obviously usable for nuclear activity. Lastly, the facility must be “relevant from the point of view of safeguards.” Any facility offered by India under Article 14 for safeguards continues to be relevant for safeguards. The issue of imported fuel is extraneous to any of these considerations.

Under the separation plan, India is offering several facilities for safeguards — not just reactors, but also heavy water plants, research and storage facilities. All these will be under safeguards if they are included in the Annex by India and will be governed by the Articles of the Agreement. Linking import of fuel with the duration of the safeguards on facilities is not relevant here. Research facilities, for example, do not even import fuel. Is it then possible that once we have offered them for safeguards, we can take them out any time we want?

Let us take the next contention that once corrective measures figure in the Agreement, it does not matter whether they are in the preamble or in the operative part of the Agreement. The issue is not whether the preamble is a part of an agreement or a treaty. The issue here is whether the scope of termination of safeguards, as defined in Articles 29-32, can be overridden by India having recourse to unspecified “corrective measures” mentioned in the preamble. Clearly, such a reading will be fanciful; else the operative part of the agreement will be rendered a nullity.

It is well established in international law that a preamble can be used to give a treaty context and help interpret its clauses. However, in no case can a preamble override explicit provisions in Articles of a treaty or be used to create new rights or obligations. If this were so, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would have led decades ago to nuclear disarmament, as this objective is set out in the preamble! It has not happened because Article 6 of the NPT merely asks the nuclear weapons states to negotiate disarmament in good faith. The operative part lacks the teeth to implement the lofty objective the preamble sets out.

The issue of fuel supply assurances and strategic fuel reserves is of little consequence in this Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA is not a body that deals with either. The preamble merely notes that the “essential basis” of India’s concurrence to the acceptance of IAEA safeguards is the conclusion of international arrangements for reliable and uninterrupted fuel supplies and support for building strategic fuel reserves. Whatever may be the basis of a country entering into an international agreement, the articles of the treaty do not get voided simply because this basis is no longer valid. The withdrawal and termination clauses govern the actual withdrawal or termination. It is pretty much like marriage: love may be the basis of a marriage but the demise of love for one party is not a sufficient legal ground for divorce.

Asked whether India could ever withdraw its reactors from safeguards, Dr R.B. Grover of the Department of Atomic Energy claimed (in a press conference on July 12) that India could first claim a material breach under Article 52(c) of the Agreement and then take whatever action it wanted under “the combination of [Articles] 29, 30(f), 10, 4, and the preamble.” Again, while Article 29 covers both facilities and material for the duration of safeguards for facilities, we have to read this provision along with Article 32. As explained earlier, Article 32 is quite explicit that once any facility is offered for safeguards, they will continue to apply in perpetuity. Article 30(f) is very much part of Article 30, which specifically pertains only to material. To claim specific rights over facilities using an Article that pertains to material will not help India in any way.

It is not in India’s interest to keep the provisions of the Agreement vague. The dispute settlement body in the IAEA is not a neutral umpire — it is the agency’s Board of Governors. Here, politics is the dominant issue in interpretation — not legalese. As the Iran case shows, despite that country having a legal right to the full nuclear fuel cycle, the IAEA Board of Governors referred it to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions at the insistence of the United States. The majority, including the Government of India, fell in line with the U.S., not because they were convinced of its legal case but because of its sheer muscle power.

Therefore to believe that the vague term “corrective measures” included in the preamble of the Safeguards Agreement will help India later to put on the term whatever interpretation it wishes to will simply not wash. If it comes to the crunch, the Hyde Act provisions will prevail. This is what is inbuilt in the India-IAEA Agreement, the government’s spin notwithstanding.

(Prabir Purkayastha is a founding member of the Delhi Science Forum and an analyst on nuclear disarmament and energy issues.)

Courtesy, The Hindu newspaper.

Indo-US nuclear safeguard agreement

DRAFT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES

RECOGNIZING the significance India attaches to civilian nuclear energy as an efficient, clean and sustainable energy source for meeting global energy demand, in particular for meeting India's growing energy needs; WHEREAS India is committed to the full development of its national three-stage nuclear programme to meet the twin challenges of energy

security and protection of the environment; WHEREAS India has a sovereign and inalienable right to carry out nuclear research and development activities for the welfare of its people and other peaceful purposes; WHEREAS India, a State with advanced nuclear technology, wishes to expand civil nuclear cooperation for its national development; WHEREAS India is desirous of further expanding cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as ''the Agency'') and its Member States with the objective of the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis; WHEREAS India supports the role of the Agency in the promotion of the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy as set forth in the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the ''Statute''); WHEREAS India and the Agency have long standing cooperation in various aspects of the Agency's activities; RECOGNIZING that such cooperation between India and the Agency must be carried out with full respect for the objectives of the Statute and with due observance of the sovereign rights of India; WHEREAS the Statute authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State to any of the State's activities in the field of atomic energy and, in this context: Noting the relevance for this Agreement of the understandings between India and the United States of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, in which India, inter alia, has stated its willingness:

• to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner;
• to file with the Agency a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities (hereinafter referred to as ''the Declaration'');
• to take a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;
  
  Noting also for the purposes of this Agreement that:
• India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards so as to facilitate full civil nuclear cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency and to provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time;
• An essential basis of India's concurrence to accept Agency safeguards under an India-specific safeguards agreement (hereinafter referred to as ''this Agreement'') is the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors; and
• India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies; WHEREAS India is desirous of expanding civil nuclear cooperation with other Member States of the Agency; WHEREAS the conclusion of this Agreement is intended to facilitate the broadest possible cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensure international participation in the further development of India's civilian nuclear programme on a sustained and long-term basis;
  RECALLING that the Agency in accordance with its Statute and safeguards system must take into account, in the implementation of safeguards in India, the need to avoid hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, economic and technological development or international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; respect health, safety and physical protection and related security provisions in force in India; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge;
  WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Agreement shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of effective and efficient Agency safeguards; WHEREAS India has requested the Agency to apply safeguards with respect to items subject to this Agreement;
  WHEREAS the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the ''Board'') acceded to that request on;
  NOW THEREFORE, taking into account the above, India and the Agency have agreed as follows:

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

• . India undertakes that none of the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose and that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
  
• The Agency undertakes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, to the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, so as to ensure, as far as it is able, that no such item is used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

• The purpose of safeguards under this Agreement is to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time.
  
• The application of safeguards under this Agreement is intended to facilitate implementation of relevant bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party, which are essential to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement.
  
• Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall implement safeguards in a manner designed to avoid hampering India's economic or technological development, and not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by India independent of this Agreement for its own purposes.
  
• The safeguards procedures set forth in this document shall be implemented in a manner designed to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.
  
• In implementing safeguards, the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets. No member of the Agency's staff shall disclose, except to the Director General and to such other members of the staff as the Director General may authorize to have such information by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, any commercial or industrial secret or any other confidential information coming to his knowledge by reason of the implementation of safeguards by the Agency.
  
• The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of safeguards in India, except that:
  
  (a) Specific information relating to such implementation in India may be given to the Board and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its safeguards responsibilities;
  (b) Summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency may be published upon decision of the Board; and
  (c) Additional information may be published upon decision of the Board and if all States directly concerned agree.
  
• In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, safeguards shall continue with respect to produced special fissionable material and to any materials substituted therefore.
  
• Nothing in this Agreement shall affect other rights and obligations of India under international law.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS

A. ITEMS SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT

• The items subject to this Agreement shall be:
  (a) Any facility listed in the Annex to this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to
  paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement;
  (b) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India which are required to be safeguarded pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which India is a party;
  (c) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material, produced, processed or used in or by the use of a facility listed in the Annex or in or by the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b);
  (d) Any nuclear material substituted in accordance with paragraph 27 or 30(d) of this Agreement for nuclear material referred to in paragraph 11(b) or 11(c) of this Agreement;
  (e) Any heavy water substituted in accordance with paragraph 32 of this Agreement for heavy water subject to this Agreement;
  (f) Any facility other than a facility identified in paragraph 11(a) above, or any other location in India, while producing, processing, using, fabricating or storing any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of this Agreement.
• The scope of this Agreement is limited to the items subject to this Agreement as defined in paragraph 11 above. Declaration
• Upon entry into force of this Agreement, and a determination by India that all conditions conducive to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement are in place, India shall file with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in a phased manner.

Notifications

• (a) India, on the basis of its sole determination, shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision to offer for Agency safeguards a facility identified by India in the Declaration referred to in paragraph 13, or any other facility to be determined by India. Any facility so notified by India to the Agency will be included in the Annex, and become subject to this Agreement, as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
  
  (b) Should India, on the basis of its sole determination, decide to import or transfer any nuclear 5 material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components subject to this Agreement to any facility or other location in India provided for in paragraph 11(f) of this agreement, it shall so notify the Agency. Any such facility or location so notified by India pursuant to this sub-paragraph shall become subject to this Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
• India shall notify the Agency of the receipt of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b) of this Agreement within four weeks of the arrival in India of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components.

Provision of Information to the Agency

• In the event that India's notification pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement relates to a facility subject to Agency safeguards under another Safeguards Agreement or Agreements in India at the time of entry into force of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, along with the relevant notification, such information as is required pursuant to the other Safeguards Agreement or Agreements as relates to any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components subject to safeguards thereunder.
  
• With respect to any other facility listed in the Annex pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, within four weeks of the relevant notification, with:
  (a) a list of all nuclear material at each such facility; and
  (b) where relevant, and if required pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which India is party, information relating to:
  i) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for production , processing, storage or use in such facility;
  (ii) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material, produced, processed or used in or by the use of such facility or in or by the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for production, processing or use in such facility.
  
• Each notification pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Agreement shall include all information relevant to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components so notified, including the facility or location where the nuclear material, non nuclear material, equipment and components so notified will be received.
  
• The information provided by India pursuant to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of this Agreement shall specify, inter alia, to the extent relevant, the nuclear and chemical composition, physical form and quantity of the nuclear material; the date of shipment; the date of receipt; the identity of the consigner and the consignee; and any other relevant information, such as the type and capacity of any facility (or parts thereof), components or equipment; and the type and quantity of non-nuclear material. In the case of a facility or other location subject to this Agreement, the information to be provided shall include the type and capacity of that facility or location, and any other relevant information.
  
• India shall thereafter notify the Agency by means of reports, in accordance with this Agreement, of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement. The Agency may verify the calculations of the amounts and/or quantities of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components, and appropriate adjustments shall be made by agreement between India and the Agency.
  
• The Agency shall maintain an inventory of items subject to this Agreement. The Agency shall send a copy of the inventory it maintains with respect to such information to India every twelve months and also at any other times specified by India in a request communicated to the Agency at least two weeks in advance.

for more:http://www.assamtimes.org/Editorial/1736.html

Post Options

On IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

The Left parties have issued the following statement:





On The IAEA Safeguards Agreement
Why the Text was Hidden till Submission to the IAEA?

The Left Parties had opposed the operationalisation of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal after the passage of the Hyde Act. After the 123 agreement was finalised, it was pointed out that the agreement was in conformity with the Hyde Act. The Left Parties had then asked the UPA Government not to take further steps to operationalise the nuclear deal.

In the UPA-Left Committee, the UPA claimed that they should be allowed to proceed with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which would incorporate uninterrupted fuel supplies and various corrective measures, which the Government had failed to secure in the 123 agreement. The Left Parties were skeptical about these issues being resolved in the IAEA. The UPA refused to show the negotiated text for the last four months.

The text of the Safeguards Agreement has now become public. It is clear that the text was hidden from the Left Parties and the Indian people in order to suppress the fact that India is about to bind its entire civilian nuclear energy programme into IAEA safeguards in perpetuity without getting concrete assurances for uninterrupted fuel supply, right to build strategic reserves and right to take corrective steps in case fuel supplies are stopped.

IAEA Safeguards in Perpetuity without Concrete Fuel Supply Assurance
The text of the draft "Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities"; the so-called 'India-specific Safeguards' agreement sent to the IAEA Board of Governors on July 9, 2008, makes it clear that the repeated assurances made by the UPA Government in Parliament and outside, on securing uninterrupted fuel supply assurances and strategic fuel reserves have not been fulfilled. There are no concrete corrective measures in the main enforceable body of the Agreement, only a vague mention of "corrective measures" in the preamble.

Under the Hyde Act, IAEA safeguards are to be imposed on India's civilian nuclear facilities in perpetuity. The UPA government had repeatedly claimed that India would put its civilian reactors under safeguards under the strictly reciprocal condition of assured fuel supply. If fuel supply was disrupted, as happened in Tarapur, India would have the right to take corrective measures, including taking reactors out of IAEA safeguards.

The key question therefore with respect to IAEA safeguards is: how to ensure that once India's civilian reactors go under safeguards in perpetuity, the country would not be blackmailed by the withholding of nuclear fuel supplies, as the United States did in Tarapur following Pokhran-I?

The preamble to the Safeguards Agreement notes that India is offering its civilian nuclear facilities for IAEA safeguards on the "essential basis" of "the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors." The real point is that the preamble merely 'notes' India's intentions in these respects. IAEA has neither any obligation regarding fuel supplies or building strategic reserves nor does this noting India's basis for this offer give India any additional rights through this agreement. Therefore to read into this clause either a guarantee for fuel supplies or IAEA's support for building up a strategic reserve is misleading the people.

"Corrective Measures": Vague and Ineffective
The preamble of the IAEA Agreement notes: "India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." Neither the "corrective measures" nor the precise relationship between these "corrective measures" and the in-perpetuity imposition is spelt out in any meaningful terms in the text. This means that should India for any reason decide to take the items subject to the Agreement out of IAEA safeguards on the contention that the "essential basis" no longer applies, it will open itself to the serious charge of violating an international agreement. In this connection, it is worth remembering that although India claims the right, under the provisions of the 1963 Indo-US agreement on Tarapur, to reprocess the considerable quantities of Tarapur spent fuel that have accumulated to India's great inconvenience and expense, it has not been able to enforce the claimed right to reprocess, which has long been disputed by the United States.

As against the vagueness of the "corrective measures" figuring in the preamble, what is spelt out clearly in the body of the agreement (Paragraph 32) is that India can withdraw its facilities from safeguards only if it is (a) jointly agreed between India and IAEA, and (b) if these facilities are no longer usable for any nuclear activity. What does this mean? It can only mean that India can withdraw any facility it wants out of IAEA safeguards only if it strips it of all capability of producing nuclear energy and that too only after the IAEA determines that "the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards."

Even if the Agreement is terminated by mutual consent, the termination of safeguards on the items subject to the Agreement [these are material and facilities as defined in Paragraph 11(a)] would stay in place in accordance with GOV/1621 till all the conditions of GOV/1621 are met. The conditions of GOV/1621 are so stringent that the rights and obligations of the parties continue to apply on all nuclear materials till they have been returned or all fissionable materials supplied or produced goes out of the inventory - that is, until all the facilities and material, nuclear or non-nuclear, supplied to the country under these safeguards are either returned or consumed or no longer usable for any nuclear activity. Therefore, this provision will not allow a single reactor to be taken out of safeguards.

Preambular References Non-Enforceable

It is well established in international law that the preamble is a part of the treaty or international agreement and it can be used to give colour and tone to the interpretation of the operative part of the treaty/agreement. This does not however mean that it can be used to create additional rights or obligations that are not contained in the clauses of the Treaty/Agreement.

The text of the IAEA Draft Agreement makes clear there are no corrective measures identified in the operative of the clauses of the Agreement. The mention of corrective measures is only in the preamble and here too, no concrete corrective measures have been defined. Unless there are specific provisions in the operative clauses, a phrase such as "corrective measures" inserted in the preamble cannot create either omnibus rights or obligations outside the text of the treaty. A similar example is for instance the TRIPS Agreement in WTO. The preamble states that it recognizes "the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives". However, can any country use the "public policy objectives" to override, for instance, the need for providing product patents as contained the body of the TRIPS agreement?

The way a facility can be withdrawn from safeguards has been spelt out in the main body of the draft agreement. Therefore, if the UPA government is trying to argue that the preambular statement of "corrective measures" gives India some kind of overriding right over all clauses in the body of the Agreement, it is committing a deliberate fraud on the people.

The final arbiter with regards to any interpretation of the Agreement and dispute settlement is the Board of Governors of IAEA. The Board of Governors decision is final in this regard and if India is held to be non-compliant, even though it is not so by its own interpretation, India can be referred to the Security Council for action including sanctions. The Iran case is an example. Though many countries including India had publicly endorsed Iran's right to the fuel cycle, it was referred to the Security Council for violation of its Safeguards Agreement by the Board of Governors at US's instance.

Left Parties' Concerns Not Addressed
The Left Parties, on July 8, 2008, asked the UPA government to spell out the following:

v In case the US or other countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group renege on fuel supply assurances for imported reactors, will India have the ability to withdraw these reactors from IAEA safeguards?

v If the US/NSG countries renege on fuel supply assurances, can we withdraw our indigenous civilian reactors from IAEA safeguards?

v If we have to bring nuclear fuel from the non-safeguarded part of our nuclear programme for these reactors in case of fuel supply assurances not being fulfilled, will we have the ability to take it back again?

v What are the corrective steps India can take if fuel supplies are interrupted by the US/NSG countries?

v What are the conditions that India must fulfill if the corrective steps are to be put into operation?

What is clear now is that every one of these concerns remains, and that the unspecified "corrective measures" inserted in the preamble of the Safeguards Agreement will not address any of them.

India to be treated as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State for Safeguarded Facilities
Except for the preamble, which explains the context in which India is entering this Safeguards Agreement and outlines the basis of India's concurrence, the main body of the Text is a true copy of INFCIRC-66/Rev.2 (1968), which is the standard agreement applicable to all Non-Nuclear Weapon States of the NPT. The India-specific part comes not from INFIRC 66 but from the fact that India has kept a part of its nuclear programme out of IAEA safeguards. But for the facilities it proposes to put under IAEA safeguards, it will be treated as a Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Clearly, India will not have any special rights in its safeguarded facilities and this directly contradicts the assurances given by the Prime Minister to Parliament. Nuclear weapon states, as defined in the NPT, have the right to take any facility out of safeguards, a right India will not have for the reactors it is offering to IAEA for safeguards.

Against India's Interests
It is clear that the IAEA Safeguards Agreement does not address the fundamental problems in the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement. As a result of operationalising the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, India will place its costly imported reactors under perpetual IAEA safeguards and risk their permanent shutdown in case it fails to toe the US line on foreign policy issues. Thus going ahead with the Safeguards Agreement will be harmful to India's interests.





Prakash Karat A.B. Bardhan





Debabrata Biswas T.J Chandrachoodan