Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Birodhira itihas bhule gechen!!!
Krishok dorodi
Thursday, September 18, 2008
Repudiate the 123 Agreement

news from the cpi(m)
September 17, 2008
Press Statement
The Polit Bureau of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) has issued the following statement:
Repudiate the 123 Agreement
The documents submitted to the US Congress by the US President along with the Presidential Determination on Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation have made it amply clear that the terms of the 123 Agreement are fully in conformity with the Hyde Act and violate the crucial commitments made by the Indian Prime Minister in Parliament. The time has come for the Indian Government to repudiate the 123 Agreement, which is not in India's national interest. The Government has no other option, as the argument that India has a different interpretation of the 123 Agreement is meaningless. The US as a supplier of nuclear equipment and materials will undertake such supply only under the terms of what it calls a "framework agreement." A different interpretation of the 123 Agreement by India will in no way bind the US as a supplier.
The Left Parties have repeatedly pointed out the provisions of the 123 Agreement, which are inimical to India's interests:
Ø India will not have any uninterrupted fuel supply assurance;
Ø India will have to place its civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards in perpetuity without such a fuel supply assurance;
Ø India will not have any assurance regarding stock piling fuel reserve for the life time of the reactors;
Ø Whatever corrective measures India may contemplate vis-à-vis fuel supply disruption, taking the reactors out of IAEA safeguards will be impermissible;
Ø India will not have access to full civilian nuclear technology;
Ø The consent to India's reprocessing of spent fuel is only notional;
Ø The US can terminate the 123 Agreement at will and stop all supplies immediately;
Ø India will have to align its foreign policy to that of the US, particularly on Iran.
All these points raised by the Left Parties have been confirmed by the documents accompanying the US Presidential Determination and have exposed the hollowness of the claims made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Parliament.
Fuel Supply Assurance and IAEA Safeguards: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had made a solemn commitment in Parliament on March 7, 2006 that India would place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in perpetuity only on the basis of strict reciprocity vis-à-vis the US guaranteeing uninterrupted fuel supply in perpetuity. In case the US defaults on its fuel supply agreement (as it did in Tarapur), it would ensure that other members of the NSG would take over its obligations. In a signed covering note to the Presidential Determination (President's Transmittal of Text to Congress) George Bush has made it clear that the fuel supply assurance in the 123 Agreement is not legally binding. It states:
"In Article 5(6) the Agreement records certain political commitments concerning reliable supply of nuclear fuel given to India in March 2006. The text of the Agreement does not, however, transform these political commitments into legally binding commitments because the Agreement, like other US agreements of its type, is intended as a framework agreement."
This categorical denial of any legally binding fuel supply assurance in the 123 Agreement by the US President is accompanied by a specific observation contained in the Report Pursuant to Section 104(c) of Hyde Act Regarding Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India accompanying the Presidential Determination, which states:
"Once a facility is listed in the Annex, safeguards will continue indefinitely unless 'India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards'.Thus the facilities and materials subject to safeguards.are under 'safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices'."
This clearly shows that India can never withdraw its civilian nuclear facilities from IAEA safeguards unilaterally, even the indigenously built reactors, in the event of a disruption of fuel supply or if the 123 Agreement is itself terminated. The Report Pursuant to Section 104(c) of Hyde Act has also left the quantity of nuclear material transferred under the 123 Agreement undefined. Therefore the US is under no obligation to help India build up adequate fuel reserves for life time operations of the reactors.
Full Co-Operation in Civilian Nuclear Technology: The Prime Minister in a suo moto statement to Parliament on July 29, 2006 had stated:
"...we committed ourselves to separating the civilian and strategic programme. However this was to be conditional upon, and reciprocal to, the United States fulfilling its side of the understanding. steps to be taken by India would be conditional upon and contingent on action taken by the United States...Before voluntarily placing our civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, we will ensure that all restrictions on India have been lifted."
However, the signed covering note to the Presidential Determination clearly states:
"It (the 123 Agreement) does not permit transfers of any restricted data. Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy-water production technology and production facilities, sensitive nuclear facilities, and major critical components of such facilities may not be transferred under the Agreement unless the Agreement is amended."
This is also reiterated in the Report Pursuant to Section 104(c) of Hyde Act. Clearly, India will not have access to the full fuel cycle and all sensitive technologies are denied under the above. The bar on access to the full nuclear fuel cycle technology is still very much a part of the technology denial regime of the US. Thus India is being asked to place its civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards in perpetuity without all restrictions being lifted.
Consent to Reprocess: The Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement accompanying the Presidential Determination states:
"Subsequent to India's March 2006 separation plan, the Indian government decided to pursue development of a new civil facility dedicated to reprocessing material under safeguards. Development of this facility (and agreement with the United States on arrangements and procedures related thereto) will be required to bring into effect the "programmatic consent" in Article 6 of the Agreement."'
Therefore, the supposed consent for India's right to reprocess spent fuel contained in the 123 Agreement is only a "programmatic consent" as per the US. It clearly states that till the arrangements and procedures are agreed to by the US in the subsequent period, this consent cannot be brought into effect. This also belies the claims made by the Government in this regard.
Extraneous Issues Tied with Nuclear Cooperation: The Prime Minister had categorically stated that tying any extraneous issues with civil nuclear cooperation will not be accepted to India. It is clear from the documents accompanying the Presidential Determination that extraneous issues have been coupled with the nuclear deal, which have also been accepted by India.
Iran: The Report Pursuant to Section 104(c) of Hyde Act approvingly talks about India aligning with the US on the Iran question both in the IAEA and the UN and that India "maintained a strong public line of support for P5+1 and U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve international concerns with Iran's nuclear program". This is contradictory to the position stated earlier that India supports the right of Iran to the full nuclear fuel cycle. The issue of nuclear weapons and the right to enrichment are two different issues and India has always maintained a public distinction between the two. However, with the External Affairs Minister's statement, India has formally changed its position and opposed Iran's fuel enrichment, a right which Iran has under Article IV of the NPT.
Missile Technology Control Regime: India has already pledged its unilateral adherence to the MTCR regime of which it is not a part. According to the Report Pursuant to Section 104(c) of Hyde Act mentions that India has written a letter stating its "adherence to the MTCR and its annex in a letter dated September, 9, 2008, to Mr. Jacques Audibert, the MTCR Point of Contact in Paris".
All this makes the 123 Agreement almost identical to the Tarapur one, where India had been forced to run from pillar to post for fuel after the US unilaterally terminated the Tarapur 123 Agreement. India still continues to hold spent fuel as the US has never given its consent to reprocessing, even though such a "programmatic consent" was there in the Tarapur 123 Agreement also. It is with the experience of Tarapur that India had sought fuel supply assurances and various other terms including the right to reprocess spent fuel. With the documents accompanying the Presidential Determination, the US has made its intentions clear - this 123 Agreement is no different from the earlier Tarapur one, with all the Tarapur problems. And India can again land into the Tarapur mess, as the right of the US to terminate the agreement is an unfettered one.
The Polit Bureau of the CPI (M) demands that the Prime Minister fulfil his pledge to the nation that he will walk away from the Nuclear Deal if it does not meet India's expectations.
Sunday, September 14, 2008
Bhumisonskar niye kichu information.
05-06 silper jonyo jomi adhigrohon hoyeche ----2322 ekor
bhumhin der modhye bhumi bontan hoyeche--8136 ekor
06-07 silper jonyo jomi adhigrohon hoyeche-----4135 ekor
bhumhin der modhye bhumi bontan hoyeche---10,848 ekor
07-08 silper jonyo jomi adhigrohon hoyeche-----3750 ekor
bhumhin der modhye bhumi bontan hoyeche---10953 ekor
ei bhabe rajyo sorkar tar bhumi bantan pokriyar madhome bhumi hin der jomi bantan kore geche abar rajye kormosonsthaner proshne silper ekta jaiga tairy korechen. didi ei pokriya bhandul korte chiche r kichui noi.
Bhmi bantoner source: rajyer bhmi sonskar bibhag.
Saturday, September 13, 2008
Singur niye Didi be-line.
Rajyosorkarer eto darun prostab peye sobai jokhon khusi tokhon didi ache sei diditei, uni kintu ekhon onar jed charte raji non, onar lakhya jeeno teno prokareno sei 300 ekor korayatwa korte hobe. Rajyo sokar ki offer diyechen dekha jak:
01: Prokolpya elakar modhye 70 ekor porjontyo jomibhittik punorbashon dewa hobe.
02.Sokol jomidatake otirikto 50%taka bishesh subidha hisabe dewa hobe.
03.Jomir malik ke khuje na pewa gele sei jomir nathi bhukta borgadar ke oi taka dewa hobe.
04.O nathivukto borgader o khet majur ra 300 diner majuri ek sathe cash e paben.
05.Protek jomidata poribarer ekjon kore chakri paben, proshinkhan praptyo ra pokriya anujayi chakri paben, bakider bishes subidha anusare kormonioyg kendre nathi vukto kora hobe, r tader ek bochorer modhye chakri hobe.
06.Lagoya gram gulo te bisheh unnayon prokolpyer madhyome rasta,haspatal, school bari, biduyter kaj kora hobe.
Eto sundor prostabe jekhane sokol singur basi khusi , sara rajyer manush jokhon khusi, khusi banik sobha gulo tokhon didi tar obhays moton sei ghola jole mach dhorte basto. Ei prostab niye samner sombare singure bamfronter bishesh shobar ayojon kora hoyeche, bikel 3 te theke, jekhane amaber CM chara bamfronter netri brindo singur basi ke tader boktobyo pesh korben. R mongol bar didir singur cholo ovijan. 19 tarik er por didi tar poroborti andolon suru korchen.r bamfront robbar theke pothe namche ei prostaber kotha sara rajyer manusher kache puonche debar jonyo.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
On NSG Waiver: Another Surrender
On NSG Waiver: Another Surrender
The NSG waiver opening the door to nuclear trade for India after a three-day long meeting is neither clean nor unconditional and reflects the continuous concessions that India has made on this issue. Starting from the joint statement of July 18, 2005, India has given in steadily to US pressure, starting with the 123 Agreement, the IAEA safeguard and now finally the NSG.
The text of the waiver has converted the voluntary moratorium on testing into a multilateral committment. India has now agreed that any fuel supply agreement will be subject to periodic NSG review and subject to India's moratorium on testing. While India clearly does not have fuel supply assurances as claimed by the Government, the Safeguards on India's nuclear facilities will be in perpetuity. The restrictions on Enrichment and Reprocessing technologies will in effect continue, as prescribed in the Hyde Act, India Government's statements to the contrary not withstanding. The Hyde Act conditions will continue to bind India and its civilian nuclear program.
The Para 3 of the waiver text makes it clear that the Separation Plan outlined in July 18, 2005 and the Foreign Minister's statement of September 5, form the basis of the waiver. All bilateral agreements including the 123 Agreement are also a part of the para 3. The full implications of the 123 Agreement, which the Indian Government had hidden from the people, are now public after the State Department statement to the US Congress have been released by Berman, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Congress. It is clear from para 3 that all other Governments will now align with the 123 Agreement and India will not get any better terms from other countries supplying fuel or reactors.
With the Foreign Minister's statement of September 5, India has now committed itself to aligning with international efforts to "limit the spread ENR (enrichment and reprocessing) equipment or technologies to states who do not have them", an obvious reference to Iran and committing India to join the US efforts to deny Iran the fuel cycle. Joining US efforts on Iran is one of the conditions of the Hyde Act. With the September 5 Statement, India is now fully a party to the non-proliferation regime, which it has always held to be discriminatory and therefore unstable. Like all other nuclear weapon states, India will henceforth pay only lip service to the disarmament agenda.
On Enrichment and Reprocessing, the reference to NSG Guidelines paras 6&7 in para 3 a) makes clear that the restrictions on transfer of such technologies will continue. The National Statements of various countries including the assurances given by the US in NSG that it is not contemplating such transfers reinforces the paras 6&7 of the Guidelines. In addition, the reference to GOV/1621 in the waiver para 2 b) also ensures that India cannot withdraw its facilities from safeguards. It might be noted that adherence by India to GOV/1621 of IAEA is also a part of the Hyde Act.
Though India is not part of the NSG it has also agreed to an open-ended commitment that it will abide by all NSG guidelines including future changes irrespective of what these changes might be. Though the NSG Chairman may confer with India (the Waiver states "the Chair is requested to consult with India) on changes to the guidelines, India cannot participate in the NSG decision-making. It may be noted that the Hyde Act in Sec. 104 (b) (6) requires commitment of unilateral adherence to NSG guidelines as part of the presidential determination before the 123 Agreement is approved.
Similarly India has also agreed to abide by an Additional Protocol with the IAEA that is yet to be even finalised, let alone signed, as part of the basis for the waiver.
As in the Hyde Act Presidential review of India's actions, the NSG will also closely monitor and review all nuclear transactions by regular exchange of information on all nuclear transfers with India. Further every plenary of the NSG will be an occasion for a full exchange of information regarding nuclear transfers (para 3c of the waiver text).
By Para 3e of the waiver text any NSG member may choose to call for consultations regarding the implementation of the terms of the waiver if they feel that occasion has arisen to do so.
It is clear that the terms of the NSG waiver afford every opportunity for any NSG country (through consultations under Para 16 of the NSG guidelines) to block separate deals that India may contemplate with countries like France or Russia that offer more advantageous terms on issues like cooperation in uranium enrichment and reprocessing.
As the NSG is an opaque body, one is not aware of what additional terms India might have agreed to. Given its track record for deliberate misinformation, as seen in the 123 Agreement, this is cause for concern. For example, what are the implications of the "auxiliary measures" that countries such as Austria have been referring to in the NSG? Are they additional NSG guidelines that are being framed keeping India in mind? It must be kept in mind that NSG is only a nuclear cartel and unlike international agreements, can change its waiver terms unilaterally.
The Hyde Act watered down many of the initial commitments in the 2005 Manmohan Singh-Bush Statement. The passage of the NSG waiver on the current terms is designed to make India adhere more firmly to the terms and conditions of the Hyde Act.
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
300 ekorer goppo....
jara bolche tata naki singure chahidar theke besi jomi niyechen tader jonyo : Mahindra tader gari karkhanar jonyo niyechen 650 ekor jomi r tader anusari silper jonyo niyechen 600 ekor jomi. foxwagoner moton bideshi company mul karkhanar jonyo niyeche 570 ekor jomi r tader anusari silpor jonyo niyeche 420 ekor jomi. r sekhane singurer tatader dewa hoyeche mul karkhanar jonyo 645 ekor r anusari silper jonyo 330 ekor.
According to NATRIP(- National Automotive Testing and R&D Infrastructure Project) eklakhya gari tairy korte hole jaiga lage 453 ekor sekhane tata boleche 3 lakhya gari tairy korbe sutrang hiseb ta sobar boja uchit.
Tuesday, September 9, 2008
Ma-mati-manush r dalali....
Rajyopal ke dayi korchi….
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
Bokhate rajnitik....
Bokhate rajnitik....
Didi tar rajnoitik jiboner suru theke chirokali erokom bhul podokhyep niyechen ebong recent singur andolone onar sei niti hin rajnoitik choritro fute beriye aslo, onar jeder jonyo ajj ondhokar banglar ojosryo tarun taurinir vabisyot.banglar silpayon ke uni rukhe dite chan sudhu nijer rajnoitik akher gochanor jonyo. uni jokhon congress e tokhon ojosryo bar uni eirokom nitihin kaj kore lok hasiyechen, 1991 sale uni Union Minister of State for Human Resources Development, Youth Affairs and Sports, and Women and Child Development er dayitwa pan 1993 salei uni podotayg koren, 1996 sale alipore ek sobhai hotath kore onar mone hoi je congress naki tik moton cpim er birodhita korche na, er protibade uni onar gayer kalo swal joriye antmyohatya koerte jan.1997 saler feb mase uni loksobhate tokhankar railmontri Rambilash Paswan ke abar nijer swal chure maren. oi somoi tini lokshabha theke ekbar podotayg koren kintu totkalin speaker tar podotayg potro grohon koren ni, 1997 sale congressi gosthi dandhe joriye giye uni gothon koren trinomul congress r tik tar porei 1998 sale lokshabha te Samajwadi Party MP, Daroga Prasad Saroj mar dhor koren. jodio samajbadi party ekhon tar porom mitro.1999 sale uni bjp sathe jog diye rail montri hon , rail montri thaka kale New Delhi-Sealdah Rajdhani Express,Howrah-Purulia Express, Sealdah-New Jalpaiguri Express, Shalimar-Bankura Express and the Sealdah-Amritsar Superfast Express ei kota train matro uni rajyo ke upohar dite paren, 2001 sale NDA theke beriye asen uni poschimbonger mukhyamontri hawar love jothariti vote uni mukh thubre poren r tarporei 2004 sale abar NDA te fire giye hatan Coal and Mines ministry. ei hochhe onar rajnoitik utthan jekhane pode pode gundami, mardanga, voyer poribesh sristi kora etc kore uni nijeke ek bokhate rajnitik hisabe protiponnyo korechen
Monday, September 1, 2008
Right of Easement …
Didi bar bar bolchen sorkar r tata naki tothakotito onichuuk krishokder jomi jobordakhal koreche, ei sob bole oil ok gulo kei uni bipode felte chaichen, jabardhakhal satwa eta sorto, jemon keu porst trust er jomite kono ekti rajnoitik daler netri talir bari tairy kore bosobas korchen. Keu take narrate parchen na. abar ei netri kolkata corporationer krishijomi dakhal kore nijer party office baniyechen, r ota je krishijomi chilo seta proman korar jonyo officer dewale birat ghas ful er chobi enke rekhe diyechen.
Lojjajanok.
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