NATIONAL INTERESTS ABANDONED,CENTRE LOYAL TO U.S : BIMAN BOSE IN LONDON

Withdrawal of the left parties has come as a result of the indifference of the U.P.A government towards the interests of the country.

These words came from the veteran Mr.biman bose,secretary, C.P.I.M state committee at a convention arranged at the asian centre in London,this sunday.Bose will be attending a number of conventions regarding education and some other subjects as well.Here,at the convention arranged by the communist association of Great Britain and the Indian workers association of Great Britain, he discussed about the contemporary political scenario in india.After his discusion he answered a number of questions on the political situation in India and West Bengal,experiences of the state government,its take and steps on industrialization and education and finally its role in the economic development of the state.A large number of N.R.I s were present at the gathering.

According to the communist leader " we forbade them from the beginning to proceed towards the nuclear deal overlooking the national interests and harming the independent foreign policy.but they did'nt listen.we have emphasized to avoid neglecting common interests,and to check the rise in prices of essential commodities.But perhaps the UPA is more keen in getting enlisted to the US goodbook.For these reasons the communists have withdrawn their support from this hopeless government."

Mr. Aftab Saddique,president,communist association of Great Britain and Mr. Hershed Bent,general secretary,Indian workers' association of Great Britain also shared their views.Dr Sunil Bhaduri presided over the convention.

Mr.Biman Bose recalled the picture during the establishment of this government,the deficit of adequete number of seats,and the role of the left parties in bringing the UPA to power."The primary goal was to maintain religious harmony within the country,thwarting racial BJP.That never meant though ,that we wholeheartdly supported each and every steps of the UPA government.The Left Front has voiced its protests whenever the common interests were overlooked and has expressed its concern.On quite a number of such cases the UPA has been forced to retreat.",basu said.

He added, "We not only emphasized on removing racial discrimintion but also on taking care of the interests of the common people.

That is why a common minimum protocol was formed.But the UPA government was devaiting from this protocol and was taking multiple steps risking the the public interest.We responded with concern.But now admist this shameless US flattery of the UPA and its proceedings over the deal,we will be the last one to support them."

Many asked him the reason for staying 30 years of long period in government.He explained that the left front government is focussed at meeting the needs of the poor people ,more specifically common people."There are still a lot of things to be done.Percentage of people living below the poverty level has decreased.Caring about the interests of the poor,developing the infrastructure of education,and creating more and more employment opportunities-these are the main objectives of this government,just like it has always been.Maintaining the success in agriculture , we have stressed on its betterment.Over it rests the agenda of industrialisation.Unfortunately people are being misguided over this aspect.The oppositions are creating a false agenda and have formed an unethical front.We observed it during the Panchayat elections.Because of this false and baseless campaigning of the opposition at some parts people have been influenced and we have'nt fared well.But CPI(M) has taken necessary remedial measures and is very eager to gain back the faith and confidence of those people.The left front is too trying its part.

The left front is dedicated to work for the poor and needy.It will maintain its tradition",bose confirmed.

(Translated from ganashakti,13th july,an article by indrajit chakravorty

translated by Koustav Ghosal,2nd yr,SFI unit member,

Netaji Subhash Engineering College)

Maobadira alochonai bosuk!!!!

maobadider nisiddho korar kotha vavche na poschimbongo sorkar. goto 3 rd july bidhan sovai amader mukhyomantri sopsto kore diyechen maobadider nisiddho kora hochhe na , oder birudhhe lorai ta hobe rajnoitik vave. sobcheye mojar bapar holo prodhanmontrir sathe jatio surakya niye ekti meeting e amader desher onek rajyo mao badider beaini ghoshonar dabi tulechilo kintu poschim bango sorkar tate badha diyechilo. amader sorkarer ovimot chilo maobadider sathe lorai mane ekdike proshasonik babosthya onyodike arthosamajik unnoyaner kormosuchi pronoyon. nisiddho kore oder niyontron kora jai na.

mao e chobi, ba mao bad prochare leaflet rakha kono opradh hisebe gonyo hobe na e rajye. jesob mao badira khun, hatya, bisforon ,dakatir moton oporadhe jukto tader birudhhe sorkari ain anujayi babosthya nebe sorkar.

jodio sorkarer mao badider dike bhalobasar hat bariye dile ki hobe 2005 theke 2008 porjontyo maobadira ei rajye khun koreche 42 jon niriho manush ke.tader modhye besir vag CPIM somorthok r ekjon CPI somorthok. era eder otorkito akromone ahoto koreche pray 47 jon manush ke. er sathe ora 12 jon police kormi ke khun koreche.

sunirdisto oporadher vitiite amader rajye 314 mao badi jail e bandi achen.

amar mao badi bandhuder kache anurodh jokhon prosashon ekhat bariye dichhe tokon tomader ki ek hat barano jai na??? na sarajibon sei lal mere lal er khela cholbe???

nirlojjo birodhi!!!!

nirlojjo birodhita!!!

01.1 st july kolkatar medical coll e yubo congress r trinomuli ra militovave hangama chalai. sudhu tai noi haspataler joruri jinishpotro nosto kore dei, asbab potro londovondo kore dei, baire theke asa shoto shoto rugi eder lupen giri te bipode poren.

02.Singure tata ra gorib manusher chikitshar jonyo je camp ti khulechilo trinomulira sekhane khomotai asar pore sei camp ti tara bandho kore diyeche.

03.Bonyai ebare sobcheye khotigrosto hoyeche purbo midnapurer bistirno anchal, proshashon jokhon bonya durgoto manushder pase ese daranor chesta korche tokon dekha gelo tmc r netri ei bonya ke man made bonya akhya diye proshasoner sathe jotorokom vave oshojogita kora jai tar udahoron rekhe gelen.tar daler kormra eker por ek sorkari tran bontone badha diye gechen , sorkari tran loot korechen. bonya r jonyo jara gram chere tran shibire jete badhyo hoyechilen tara jodi cpim somorthok hon to tader grame firte badha diyechen.

voddrotya ba souyjanyo bodh bole jodi kichu thake ta ei sob birodhider songbidhane nei, obosoi eta ei dal gulir jonmobidhi sohojato bishoi. noile uttor 24 pgs, purbo midnapur ba hoogly te jela porishoder sovapoti ba soho sovapoti nirbachoner somoi je achar acroron korechen ta kono vodro loker hote paren na.

NREGA shines for Tripura women

The earthen road that connects Doctors Tilla area of Purba Barjala gram panchayat to Mandai main road in Jirania block of West Tripura district, constructed under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), was completed in August last year. The one kilometre long road has provided the villagers, mostly the womenfolk, immense satisfaction, not only because that they now need not walk a long distance to reach the market area, but because the construction of the road gave them an opportunity to earn.

The brick soling of the road is likely start in this year for which they are now eagerly waiting. The construction work involving a total cost of Rs.73,800 started on 15 July last year, generated 1230 person days in the village, and was completed within one and half months. For the women engaged in the work, mostly belonging to the Bengali community, this provided extra earnings for their families. In fact, ever since the NREGA schemes have been implemented in their locality, they have been able to augment their family income. The male folk of the village move to nearby towns in search of jobs, where they can earn between Rs.120 to Rs.150 per day on an average. Lack of job opportunities for women in the area has made them remain at home. In such a situation, the NREGA projects have provided relief.

If NREGA schemes are meant for enhancement of family income for women in Purba Barjala village, for the tribal women belonging to Tripuri tribe in Chargharia, a village under the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC), earning under NREGA project is crucial for their living. These landless tribals have no means of livelihood except depending on daily wage earnings in nearby town or in brick-making industries, which is not ensured everyday.

“There is no work available for women. The two kilometre road construction work under NREGA gave us the opportunity to work and earn something. But it was completed before the state assembly election. After the election, we are looking forward to more jobs under the scheme,” said Piranjay Debbarma, a senior woman of the village.

Be it for an increase in the family income or a crucial tool for living, Tripura engages a substantial number of women in NREGA projects as compared to other northeastern states. In some pockets like Jirania and Dukli blocks, participation of women in NREGA works is amazing. In Dukli Gram Sabha of Dukli Block, 10 km away from the capital city Agartala, percentage of women engaged in NREGA schemes has goes up to 70 to 80 per cent, says S R Choudhury, the Block Development Officer.

“This is because NREGA works fetch a relatively low wage – about Rs. 85 per day. Because of this, menfolk show little interest in these works. The daily wage, even for unskilled work, is much higher. For skilled jobs, the men get as much as Rs. 200 per day,” the BDO says.

The Minister for Rural Development, Jitendra Choudhury, while acknowledging that the high women participation in NREGA schemes is a very positive aspect, adds that as the left-front government of the state has been able to ensure substantial job opportunities for the male folk in rural pockets, women have come forward to take part in NREGA works. Also, the state has moved for multi-cropping agriculture practices instead of traditional single cropping, which also keeps the men busy in fields, giving women more opportunities to avail of NREGA facilities. In Tripura, in the non-tribal segment, the agriculture practice is an all-male activity.

Another reason is, perhaps, women feel safe at the work place in a better socio-economic environment, the minister adds. Stating that participation of women is highly encouraging he says that it would definitely give rural economy a boost in the near future.

Statistics say

In Khedarnal village of Amarpur block in North Tripura district, 100 person days have been generated for all the 321 families during 2007-08, under the NREGA implementation schemes. This is for the first time in the country that 100 person days were generated for all the families in a village selected for NREGA schemes. Altogether 32,100 person days were generated under the scheme during the year.

A state progress report of NREGA activities has recorded percentage of person days for women as 44.51, which is higher than the national average of 42.52. The state has the highest record so far in terms of employing women in NREGA projects amongst the northeastern states. In some of the major tribal states, percentage of employment for women are: Arunachal Pradesh - 29.58, Nagaland -29.36 and Mijoram – 36.62. In matrilineal Meghalaya, it is only 30.87 while Assam records 30.85 women employment and Manipur records 32.80.

The department of rural development records generation of person-days as 181.04 lakh, with creation of an average 38.86 person-days per family in 2007-08. The state recorded issuing of 4,65,779 job cards for the year 2007-08 in three districts including West Tripura, South Tripura and Dhalai. While Dhalai was the first to be selected for the NREGA projects in 2006-07, West and South Tripura were selected in 2007-08. The North district has been selected only in 2008-09, and works are yet to be implemented.

Percentage of person-days for scheduled tribes that constitute 31 per cent of the total population was 41.95 during the year. In Dhalai district, 76.03 person-days per family have been generated in 2007-08.

“Taking the Dhalai district experience, the first NREGA district in our state into account, we are expecting generation of more person-days in 2008-09 in West and South districts also. Normally it takes some time in planning during the first year. Implementation process shows good results only from the second year after selection of the district for NREGA scheme,” says Brijesh Pandey, secretary, rural development. Even in South district, the department could generate 100 person-days for 216 families in very first year of NREGA implementation, he says. The NREGA manual ensures 100 days job-guarantee to all families identified for NREGA schemes.

Aim to create permanent assets

One of the objectives of NREGA implementation projects in Tripura is creation of permanent assets by construction of road infrastructures. In Jirania Block for instance, out of the 33 NREGA projects for 2007-08, 14 were brick soling road construction projects.

The state records construction of 6,716 kilometres of road under NREGA projects in 2007-08. In Dhalai, another 962.66 kilometres have been constructed during that year. Justifying the major thrust on road construction, the minister says that while road construction is a permanent asset building process aimed at accelerating developmental activities at grassroots, the state government has set a target that every hamlet having a population of 250 will be covered with a blacktopping road within next two years.

“Ensuring person days is not the sole objective of Tripura model of NREGA implementation. Our thrust also rests on creation of permanent assets in the state”, Pandey says.

Apart from the road construction schemes, other projects that have a priority in NREGA schemes include water conservation and water harvesting, micro-irrigation works, renovation of traditional water-bodies, fisheries, land development, flood control and protection, culverts and RCC bridges.

Performance

In terms of performance of NREGA implementation, Tripura ranks second in the country. The record of other northeastern states as regards their performance: Mizoram – fifth in the country, Manipur – seventh, Assam – thirteenth, Meghalaya – eighteenth, Arunachal – nineteenth and Nagaland – twentieth. The ranking parameters include transparency, accountability, vigilance, monitoring, evaluation, physical performance indicator, financial performance indicator, staffing, training and others, according to NREGA guidelines.

http://www.indiatogether.org/2008/jun/wom-nrega.htm

Does the IAEA agreement hide us from the Hyde Act?

Various commentators have argued that the draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement gives India considerable leeway, denied it under the Hyde Act, in taking corrective action in case fuel supplies are interrupted. To be fair, unlike government spokespersons, some of these analysts concede that all imported reactors will remain permanently under safeguards. But one of the claims adduced by these non-official defenders in support of the Agreement is that India can unilaterally withdra w from IAEA safeguards its indigenous reactors that are made subject to the Agreement, provided all the imported fuel is taken out.

This curious conclusion flows from a wholly untenable reading of Article 29 of the Agreement, which states: “The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973).” Since the latter is a restricted document of the IAEA’s Board of Governors, these non-official analysts have speculated that with respect to termination of safeguards, the import of GOV/1621 into Article 29 has let non-supplied facilities off the hook, by requiring them to be under safeguards only as long as they use imported fuel! From this, they have jumped to the conclusion that therefore for such indigenous facilities, India does not even need to invoke its preambular ‘right’ to take “corrective measures.”

Nowhere does GOV/1621 provide the remotest sanction for any such interpretation. I happen to have the text of this restricted 1973 document. It originated from the urging of “a substantial number of Governors … that there should be a greater degree of standardisation than in the past with respect to the duration and termination of such agreements as may henceforth be concluded under the Agency’s Safeguards System … for the application of safeguards in connection with nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material supplied to States by third parties.”

Two concepts are clearly laid out in the IAEA document for these future agreements: (a) “the duration of the agreement should be related to the period of actual use of the items in the recipient State”; and (b) “the provisions for terminating the agreement should be formulated in such a way that the rights and obligations of the parties continue to apply in connection with supplied nuclear material and with special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material, until such time as the Agency has terminated the application of safeguards thereto...”

Further, by way of exposition of these concepts, the Annex to the document makes it clear that after termination, “the rights and obligations of the parties, as provided for in the agreement, would continue to apply in connection with any supplied material or items and with any special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connection with any supplied material or items which have been included in the inventory, until such material or items had been removed from the inventory” (emphasis added). The only way such “items or non-nuclear material could be removed from the purview of the agreement” is “if they had been consumed, were no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or had become practically irrecoverable.”

GOV/1621 ensures that all such materials “would be subject to safeguards until the Agency had terminated safeguards on that special fissionable and nuclear material in accordance with the provisions of the Agency’s Safeguards System. Thus, the actual termination of the operation of the provisions of the Agreement would take place only when everything had been removed from the inventory” (emphasis added).

The effect of GOV/1621, therefore, is to tighten and make more restrictive the application of IAEA safeguards to all supplied nuclear material, facilities, and items. But it is wholly fanciful to say that it empowers or even allows India to take non-supplied facilities made subject to the Agreement out of safeguards, if they no longer use supplied fuel.

For indigenous nuclear facilities that have been built without supplies from any third party, we have to consider two additional Articles of the Agreement. One is that “items” for safeguards are governed by Article 11(a), which defines items to include: “any facility listed in the Annex to this Agreement, as notified by India.” The second is Article 32, which explicitly states: “Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards” (emphasis added).

If we accept that Article 32 will come into play for taking facilities out of safeguards, there are three conditions that need to be fulfilled. First, both parties — India and the IAEA — need to agree to this; it is not a unilateral decision for India to make. Secondly, the facility must no longer be usable for any nuclear activity. Any facility that produces nuclear energy is obviously usable for nuclear activity. Lastly, the facility must be “relevant from the point of view of safeguards.” Any facility offered by India under Article 14 for safeguards continues to be relevant for safeguards. The issue of imported fuel is extraneous to any of these considerations.

Under the separation plan, India is offering several facilities for safeguards — not just reactors, but also heavy water plants, research and storage facilities. All these will be under safeguards if they are included in the Annex by India and will be governed by the Articles of the Agreement. Linking import of fuel with the duration of the safeguards on facilities is not relevant here. Research facilities, for example, do not even import fuel. Is it then possible that once we have offered them for safeguards, we can take them out any time we want?

Let us take the next contention that once corrective measures figure in the Agreement, it does not matter whether they are in the preamble or in the operative part of the Agreement. The issue is not whether the preamble is a part of an agreement or a treaty. The issue here is whether the scope of termination of safeguards, as defined in Articles 29-32, can be overridden by India having recourse to unspecified “corrective measures” mentioned in the preamble. Clearly, such a reading will be fanciful; else the operative part of the agreement will be rendered a nullity.

It is well established in international law that a preamble can be used to give a treaty context and help interpret its clauses. However, in no case can a preamble override explicit provisions in Articles of a treaty or be used to create new rights or obligations. If this were so, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would have led decades ago to nuclear disarmament, as this objective is set out in the preamble! It has not happened because Article 6 of the NPT merely asks the nuclear weapons states to negotiate disarmament in good faith. The operative part lacks the teeth to implement the lofty objective the preamble sets out.

The issue of fuel supply assurances and strategic fuel reserves is of little consequence in this Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA is not a body that deals with either. The preamble merely notes that the “essential basis” of India’s concurrence to the acceptance of IAEA safeguards is the conclusion of international arrangements for reliable and uninterrupted fuel supplies and support for building strategic fuel reserves. Whatever may be the basis of a country entering into an international agreement, the articles of the treaty do not get voided simply because this basis is no longer valid. The withdrawal and termination clauses govern the actual withdrawal or termination. It is pretty much like marriage: love may be the basis of a marriage but the demise of love for one party is not a sufficient legal ground for divorce.

Asked whether India could ever withdraw its reactors from safeguards, Dr R.B. Grover of the Department of Atomic Energy claimed (in a press conference on July 12) that India could first claim a material breach under Article 52(c) of the Agreement and then take whatever action it wanted under “the combination of [Articles] 29, 30(f), 10, 4, and the preamble.” Again, while Article 29 covers both facilities and material for the duration of safeguards for facilities, we have to read this provision along with Article 32. As explained earlier, Article 32 is quite explicit that once any facility is offered for safeguards, they will continue to apply in perpetuity. Article 30(f) is very much part of Article 30, which specifically pertains only to material. To claim specific rights over facilities using an Article that pertains to material will not help India in any way.

It is not in India’s interest to keep the provisions of the Agreement vague. The dispute settlement body in the IAEA is not a neutral umpire — it is the agency’s Board of Governors. Here, politics is the dominant issue in interpretation — not legalese. As the Iran case shows, despite that country having a legal right to the full nuclear fuel cycle, the IAEA Board of Governors referred it to the United Nations Security Council for sanctions at the insistence of the United States. The majority, including the Government of India, fell in line with the U.S., not because they were convinced of its legal case but because of its sheer muscle power.

Therefore to believe that the vague term “corrective measures” included in the preamble of the Safeguards Agreement will help India later to put on the term whatever interpretation it wishes to will simply not wash. If it comes to the crunch, the Hyde Act provisions will prevail. This is what is inbuilt in the India-IAEA Agreement, the government’s spin notwithstanding.

(Prabir Purkayastha is a founding member of the Delhi Science Forum and an analyst on nuclear disarmament and energy issues.)

Courtesy, The Hindu newspaper.

Indo-US nuclear safeguard agreement

DRAFT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES

RECOGNIZING the significance India attaches to civilian nuclear energy as an efficient, clean and sustainable energy source for meeting global energy demand, in particular for meeting India's growing energy needs; WHEREAS India is committed to the full development of its national three-stage nuclear programme to meet the twin challenges of energy

security and protection of the environment; WHEREAS India has a sovereign and inalienable right to carry out nuclear research and development activities for the welfare of its people and other peaceful purposes; WHEREAS India, a State with advanced nuclear technology, wishes to expand civil nuclear cooperation for its national development; WHEREAS India is desirous of further expanding cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as ''the Agency'') and its Member States with the objective of the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis; WHEREAS India supports the role of the Agency in the promotion of the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy as set forth in the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the ''Statute''); WHEREAS India and the Agency have long standing cooperation in various aspects of the Agency's activities; RECOGNIZING that such cooperation between India and the Agency must be carried out with full respect for the objectives of the Statute and with due observance of the sovereign rights of India; WHEREAS the Statute authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State to any of the State's activities in the field of atomic energy and, in this context: Noting the relevance for this Agreement of the understandings between India and the United States of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, in which India, inter alia, has stated its willingness:

• to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner;
• to file with the Agency a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities (hereinafter referred to as ''the Declaration'');
• to take a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;
  
  Noting also for the purposes of this Agreement that:
• India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards so as to facilitate full civil nuclear cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency and to provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time;
• An essential basis of India's concurrence to accept Agency safeguards under an India-specific safeguards agreement (hereinafter referred to as ''this Agreement'') is the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors; and
• India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies; WHEREAS India is desirous of expanding civil nuclear cooperation with other Member States of the Agency; WHEREAS the conclusion of this Agreement is intended to facilitate the broadest possible cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ensure international participation in the further development of India's civilian nuclear programme on a sustained and long-term basis;
  RECALLING that the Agency in accordance with its Statute and safeguards system must take into account, in the implementation of safeguards in India, the need to avoid hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, economic and technological development or international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; respect health, safety and physical protection and related security provisions in force in India; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge;
  WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Agreement shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of effective and efficient Agency safeguards; WHEREAS India has requested the Agency to apply safeguards with respect to items subject to this Agreement;
  WHEREAS the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the ''Board'') acceded to that request on;
  NOW THEREFORE, taking into account the above, India and the Agency have agreed as follows:

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

• . India undertakes that none of the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose and that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
  
• The Agency undertakes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, to the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, so as to ensure, as far as it is able, that no such item is used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

• The purpose of safeguards under this Agreement is to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time.
  
• The application of safeguards under this Agreement is intended to facilitate implementation of relevant bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party, which are essential to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement.
  
• Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall implement safeguards in a manner designed to avoid hampering India's economic or technological development, and not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by India independent of this Agreement for its own purposes.
  
• The safeguards procedures set forth in this document shall be implemented in a manner designed to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.
  
• In implementing safeguards, the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets. No member of the Agency's staff shall disclose, except to the Director General and to such other members of the staff as the Director General may authorize to have such information by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, any commercial or industrial secret or any other confidential information coming to his knowledge by reason of the implementation of safeguards by the Agency.
  
• The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of safeguards in India, except that:
  
  (a) Specific information relating to such implementation in India may be given to the Board and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its safeguards responsibilities;
  (b) Summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency may be published upon decision of the Board; and
  (c) Additional information may be published upon decision of the Board and if all States directly concerned agree.
  
• In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, safeguards shall continue with respect to produced special fissionable material and to any materials substituted therefore.
  
• Nothing in this Agreement shall affect other rights and obligations of India under international law.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS

A. ITEMS SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT

• The items subject to this Agreement shall be:
  (a) Any facility listed in the Annex to this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to
  paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement;
  (b) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India which are required to be safeguarded pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which India is a party;
  (c) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material, produced, processed or used in or by the use of a facility listed in the Annex or in or by the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b);
  (d) Any nuclear material substituted in accordance with paragraph 27 or 30(d) of this Agreement for nuclear material referred to in paragraph 11(b) or 11(c) of this Agreement;
  (e) Any heavy water substituted in accordance with paragraph 32 of this Agreement for heavy water subject to this Agreement;
  (f) Any facility other than a facility identified in paragraph 11(a) above, or any other location in India, while producing, processing, using, fabricating or storing any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of this Agreement.
• The scope of this Agreement is limited to the items subject to this Agreement as defined in paragraph 11 above. Declaration
• Upon entry into force of this Agreement, and a determination by India that all conditions conducive to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement are in place, India shall file with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in a phased manner.

Notifications

• (a) India, on the basis of its sole determination, shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision to offer for Agency safeguards a facility identified by India in the Declaration referred to in paragraph 13, or any other facility to be determined by India. Any facility so notified by India to the Agency will be included in the Annex, and become subject to this Agreement, as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
  
  (b) Should India, on the basis of its sole determination, decide to import or transfer any nuclear 5 material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components subject to this Agreement to any facility or other location in India provided for in paragraph 11(f) of this agreement, it shall so notify the Agency. Any such facility or location so notified by India pursuant to this sub-paragraph shall become subject to this Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
• India shall notify the Agency of the receipt of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b) of this Agreement within four weeks of the arrival in India of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components.

Provision of Information to the Agency

• In the event that India's notification pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement relates to a facility subject to Agency safeguards under another Safeguards Agreement or Agreements in India at the time of entry into force of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, along with the relevant notification, such information as is required pursuant to the other Safeguards Agreement or Agreements as relates to any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components subject to safeguards thereunder.
  
• With respect to any other facility listed in the Annex pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, within four weeks of the relevant notification, with:
  (a) a list of all nuclear material at each such facility; and
  (b) where relevant, and if required pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which India is party, information relating to:
  i) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for production , processing, storage or use in such facility;
  (ii) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material, produced, processed or used in or by the use of such facility or in or by the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for production, processing or use in such facility.
  
• Each notification pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Agreement shall include all information relevant to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components so notified, including the facility or location where the nuclear material, non nuclear material, equipment and components so notified will be received.
  
• The information provided by India pursuant to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of this Agreement shall specify, inter alia, to the extent relevant, the nuclear and chemical composition, physical form and quantity of the nuclear material; the date of shipment; the date of receipt; the identity of the consigner and the consignee; and any other relevant information, such as the type and capacity of any facility (or parts thereof), components or equipment; and the type and quantity of non-nuclear material. In the case of a facility or other location subject to this Agreement, the information to be provided shall include the type and capacity of that facility or location, and any other relevant information.
  
• India shall thereafter notify the Agency by means of reports, in accordance with this Agreement, of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement. The Agency may verify the calculations of the amounts and/or quantities of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components, and appropriate adjustments shall be made by agreement between India and the Agency.
  
• The Agency shall maintain an inventory of items subject to this Agreement. The Agency shall send a copy of the inventory it maintains with respect to such information to India every twelve months and also at any other times specified by India in a request communicated to the Agency at least two weeks in advance.

for more:http://www.assamtimes.org/Editorial/1736.html

Post Options

On IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

The Left parties have issued the following statement:





On The IAEA Safeguards Agreement
Why the Text was Hidden till Submission to the IAEA?

The Left Parties had opposed the operationalisation of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal after the passage of the Hyde Act. After the 123 agreement was finalised, it was pointed out that the agreement was in conformity with the Hyde Act. The Left Parties had then asked the UPA Government not to take further steps to operationalise the nuclear deal.

In the UPA-Left Committee, the UPA claimed that they should be allowed to proceed with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which would incorporate uninterrupted fuel supplies and various corrective measures, which the Government had failed to secure in the 123 agreement. The Left Parties were skeptical about these issues being resolved in the IAEA. The UPA refused to show the negotiated text for the last four months.

The text of the Safeguards Agreement has now become public. It is clear that the text was hidden from the Left Parties and the Indian people in order to suppress the fact that India is about to bind its entire civilian nuclear energy programme into IAEA safeguards in perpetuity without getting concrete assurances for uninterrupted fuel supply, right to build strategic reserves and right to take corrective steps in case fuel supplies are stopped.

IAEA Safeguards in Perpetuity without Concrete Fuel Supply Assurance
The text of the draft "Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities"; the so-called 'India-specific Safeguards' agreement sent to the IAEA Board of Governors on July 9, 2008, makes it clear that the repeated assurances made by the UPA Government in Parliament and outside, on securing uninterrupted fuel supply assurances and strategic fuel reserves have not been fulfilled. There are no concrete corrective measures in the main enforceable body of the Agreement, only a vague mention of "corrective measures" in the preamble.

Under the Hyde Act, IAEA safeguards are to be imposed on India's civilian nuclear facilities in perpetuity. The UPA government had repeatedly claimed that India would put its civilian reactors under safeguards under the strictly reciprocal condition of assured fuel supply. If fuel supply was disrupted, as happened in Tarapur, India would have the right to take corrective measures, including taking reactors out of IAEA safeguards.

The key question therefore with respect to IAEA safeguards is: how to ensure that once India's civilian reactors go under safeguards in perpetuity, the country would not be blackmailed by the withholding of nuclear fuel supplies, as the United States did in Tarapur following Pokhran-I?

The preamble to the Safeguards Agreement notes that India is offering its civilian nuclear facilities for IAEA safeguards on the "essential basis" of "the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors." The real point is that the preamble merely 'notes' India's intentions in these respects. IAEA has neither any obligation regarding fuel supplies or building strategic reserves nor does this noting India's basis for this offer give India any additional rights through this agreement. Therefore to read into this clause either a guarantee for fuel supplies or IAEA's support for building up a strategic reserve is misleading the people.

"Corrective Measures": Vague and Ineffective
The preamble of the IAEA Agreement notes: "India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." Neither the "corrective measures" nor the precise relationship between these "corrective measures" and the in-perpetuity imposition is spelt out in any meaningful terms in the text. This means that should India for any reason decide to take the items subject to the Agreement out of IAEA safeguards on the contention that the "essential basis" no longer applies, it will open itself to the serious charge of violating an international agreement. In this connection, it is worth remembering that although India claims the right, under the provisions of the 1963 Indo-US agreement on Tarapur, to reprocess the considerable quantities of Tarapur spent fuel that have accumulated to India's great inconvenience and expense, it has not been able to enforce the claimed right to reprocess, which has long been disputed by the United States.

As against the vagueness of the "corrective measures" figuring in the preamble, what is spelt out clearly in the body of the agreement (Paragraph 32) is that India can withdraw its facilities from safeguards only if it is (a) jointly agreed between India and IAEA, and (b) if these facilities are no longer usable for any nuclear activity. What does this mean? It can only mean that India can withdraw any facility it wants out of IAEA safeguards only if it strips it of all capability of producing nuclear energy and that too only after the IAEA determines that "the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards."

Even if the Agreement is terminated by mutual consent, the termination of safeguards on the items subject to the Agreement [these are material and facilities as defined in Paragraph 11(a)] would stay in place in accordance with GOV/1621 till all the conditions of GOV/1621 are met. The conditions of GOV/1621 are so stringent that the rights and obligations of the parties continue to apply on all nuclear materials till they have been returned or all fissionable materials supplied or produced goes out of the inventory - that is, until all the facilities and material, nuclear or non-nuclear, supplied to the country under these safeguards are either returned or consumed or no longer usable for any nuclear activity. Therefore, this provision will not allow a single reactor to be taken out of safeguards.

Preambular References Non-Enforceable

It is well established in international law that the preamble is a part of the treaty or international agreement and it can be used to give colour and tone to the interpretation of the operative part of the treaty/agreement. This does not however mean that it can be used to create additional rights or obligations that are not contained in the clauses of the Treaty/Agreement.

The text of the IAEA Draft Agreement makes clear there are no corrective measures identified in the operative of the clauses of the Agreement. The mention of corrective measures is only in the preamble and here too, no concrete corrective measures have been defined. Unless there are specific provisions in the operative clauses, a phrase such as "corrective measures" inserted in the preamble cannot create either omnibus rights or obligations outside the text of the treaty. A similar example is for instance the TRIPS Agreement in WTO. The preamble states that it recognizes "the underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological objectives". However, can any country use the "public policy objectives" to override, for instance, the need for providing product patents as contained the body of the TRIPS agreement?

The way a facility can be withdrawn from safeguards has been spelt out in the main body of the draft agreement. Therefore, if the UPA government is trying to argue that the preambular statement of "corrective measures" gives India some kind of overriding right over all clauses in the body of the Agreement, it is committing a deliberate fraud on the people.

The final arbiter with regards to any interpretation of the Agreement and dispute settlement is the Board of Governors of IAEA. The Board of Governors decision is final in this regard and if India is held to be non-compliant, even though it is not so by its own interpretation, India can be referred to the Security Council for action including sanctions. The Iran case is an example. Though many countries including India had publicly endorsed Iran's right to the fuel cycle, it was referred to the Security Council for violation of its Safeguards Agreement by the Board of Governors at US's instance.

Left Parties' Concerns Not Addressed
The Left Parties, on July 8, 2008, asked the UPA government to spell out the following:

v In case the US or other countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group renege on fuel supply assurances for imported reactors, will India have the ability to withdraw these reactors from IAEA safeguards?

v If the US/NSG countries renege on fuel supply assurances, can we withdraw our indigenous civilian reactors from IAEA safeguards?

v If we have to bring nuclear fuel from the non-safeguarded part of our nuclear programme for these reactors in case of fuel supply assurances not being fulfilled, will we have the ability to take it back again?

v What are the corrective steps India can take if fuel supplies are interrupted by the US/NSG countries?

v What are the conditions that India must fulfill if the corrective steps are to be put into operation?

What is clear now is that every one of these concerns remains, and that the unspecified "corrective measures" inserted in the preamble of the Safeguards Agreement will not address any of them.

India to be treated as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State for Safeguarded Facilities
Except for the preamble, which explains the context in which India is entering this Safeguards Agreement and outlines the basis of India's concurrence, the main body of the Text is a true copy of INFCIRC-66/Rev.2 (1968), which is the standard agreement applicable to all Non-Nuclear Weapon States of the NPT. The India-specific part comes not from INFIRC 66 but from the fact that India has kept a part of its nuclear programme out of IAEA safeguards. But for the facilities it proposes to put under IAEA safeguards, it will be treated as a Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Clearly, India will not have any special rights in its safeguarded facilities and this directly contradicts the assurances given by the Prime Minister to Parliament. Nuclear weapon states, as defined in the NPT, have the right to take any facility out of safeguards, a right India will not have for the reactors it is offering to IAEA for safeguards.

Against India's Interests
It is clear that the IAEA Safeguards Agreement does not address the fundamental problems in the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement. As a result of operationalising the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, India will place its costly imported reactors under perpetual IAEA safeguards and risk their permanent shutdown in case it fails to toe the US line on foreign policy issues. Thus going ahead with the Safeguards Agreement will be harmful to India's interests.





Prakash Karat A.B. Bardhan





Debabrata Biswas T.J Chandrachoodan