Monday, July 28, 2008
Sunday, July 27, 2008
Desh ke bandhok rakche kendriyo Sorkar.
EX Markin Congress er Protirakhya Upodesta Mr. Subrata Ghosh Roy er ovimot holo " Desh ke bandhk rekhe chukti korte choleche bharot." tar ovimot amader deshe je paromanobik chulli gulo ache tate vari jal projukti use kora hoye thake kintu us r sathe chukti hole ora amader ke debe halka jal projukti nirvor paromanobik chulli. sudhu tai noi amader jabotio ostro soronjam kenar jonyyo nirvor kore thakte hobe NSG vukto 45 ti desher opre. aro mojr kotha oi je samorik equipment gulo ora amader bechbe seta r kono spare parts porjonto amra amader deshe banate parbo na.
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Saturday, July 26, 2008
Punji o Rajyo Sorkar -II
arekti bapare proshno tola hochhe, amader rajyo sorkar keno bar bar punji biniyogkarider ei rajye tene anar bapare dourodouri korchen??? jara asben tara to nijer agrohei asben. rajyo sorkarer torofe tader eto sujog subidha dewar ki dorkar ache??
besorkari biniyog jokhon prodhan ebong jokhon lisence babostya uthe geche tokhon biniyog akorshoner jonyo rajyogulir modhye protijogita suru hoyeche, eke aswikar kora jabe na, rajyo gulo biniyog karider nana arthik subidha dewar niti ghosona koreche. punjir probonota sob somoi besi munafa orjonyer dike. tara artho -vougalik, porikathamo,bajar etc nana dike bibechona korei biniyoger sidhanto grohon kore. sutoranj rajyo sorkar jodi biniyog niye asar khetre kono agroho na dekhai, nischit babhei biniyog tokhon ei rajye asbe na. jeta amader kache bastob mone hoi ni. sutorang jodi amra jodi rajye silpe biniyog chai, tahole biniyog jate ase tar jonyo rajyo sorkarer udoyg thaka chai.
besorkari biniyog jokhon prodhan ebong jokhon lisence babostya uthe geche tokhon biniyog akorshoner jonyo rajyogulir modhye protijogita suru hoyeche, eke aswikar kora jabe na, rajyo gulo biniyog karider nana arthik subidha dewar niti ghosona koreche. punjir probonota sob somoi besi munafa orjonyer dike. tara artho -vougalik, porikathamo,bajar etc nana dike bibechona korei biniyoger sidhanto grohon kore. sutoranj rajyo sorkar jodi biniyog niye asar khetre kono agroho na dekhai, nischit babhei biniyog tokhon ei rajye asbe na. jeta amader kache bastob mone hoi ni. sutorang jodi amra jodi rajye silpe biniyog chai, tahole biniyog jate ase tar jonyo rajyo sorkarer udoyg thaka chai.
Hai!!! Birodhi Netri.
ajker anondo bajar potrikar ekti khabar sobai nischoi porechen, tate lekha hoyeche Proshasok momotar sathe baithak korte chan silpomantri Nirupom Sen, karon south 24 porgona ebong purbo midnapurer jela porishod ekhon trinomuler r eikhane royeche ekgada sorkari prokolpyo , jemon kukrahati -raychak setu, usti theke raychak ebong usti theke namkhana sorok prokolpyo, aro jemon nayachore petro rosayon silpo taluk, badur kache jahaj nirman silpo sathe govir samudre bondor prkolpya, ei sob jaigai silpo korte gele jomo adhigrohon ekta boro smosya r ei kaje birodhi dal jodi sohayota na kore se khetre khoti hobe rajyer. ekdike jemon natun silpo gore uthbe na temni kormosonsthan o bahot hobe. r ei je sorok porikolpona gulo ache ete sadharon manusher osesh subidhai hobe na sathe oi proklopye kaj pabe oi elakar khete khawa manush. othocho dekhun didi sorasori mantrir ei prostab nakoch kore diyeche sei singur karkhanar dohai diye. uni je ekjon gothonmulok birodhi netri non abar ta proman korlen. onar rajyer unnati niye adoui kono chinta ache janar ichha roilo???
CPIM o bideshi punji!!!
Jara bolche CPIM ekhon bideshi punjir dalal hoye geche tader jonyo ei thread, amader party kormosuchi te bedeshi punji biniyoger khetre tinti sorto arop kora hoyeche.
01. je bedishi punji ekhane biniyog hobe ta amader desher silper projukti ke unnoto korte sahajyo korbe.jate amra sei projukti ke awywta korte pari.
02.amader desher ponyer utpadon khomota ke bridhi korte hobe.
03.ei punji biniyog o utpadon khomota bridhi amader desher kormosonsthyan bridhir sohayok hobe.
ei tinti sorto mene kono bidshi punji ele amra tar birodh korbo na. kintu jokhon bideshi punji banking ba ins. segment or kichu strategic secotor e jokhon biniyog hochhe ja amader orthanaitik sarbovoumottake biponnyo kore tuleche, amra tokhon tar birodhita korchi.
aro kichu khetre amader bideshi biniyoge apotti ache, jemon krishikhetre bij,sar ba krishijomi ke ghire bohujatik corporate ra je babsya korte chaiche amra tar birodhi.
01. je bedishi punji ekhane biniyog hobe ta amader desher silper projukti ke unnoto korte sahajyo korbe.jate amra sei projukti ke awywta korte pari.
02.amader desher ponyer utpadon khomota ke bridhi korte hobe.
03.ei punji biniyog o utpadon khomota bridhi amader desher kormosonsthyan bridhir sohayok hobe.
ei tinti sorto mene kono bidshi punji ele amra tar birodh korbo na. kintu jokhon bideshi punji banking ba ins. segment or kichu strategic secotor e jokhon biniyog hochhe ja amader orthanaitik sarbovoumottake biponnyo kore tuleche, amra tokhon tar birodhita korchi.
aro kichu khetre amader bideshi biniyoge apotti ache, jemon krishikhetre bij,sar ba krishijomi ke ghire bohujatik corporate ra je babsya korte chaiche amra tar birodhi.
Friday, July 25, 2008
Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal
marxistindia
news from the cpi(m)
Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal
P. K. Iyengar
Chairman (Retd.), Atomic Energy Commission
In spite of the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest, many in the country, and in Parliament, support it because of misconceptions about the deal, which need to be clarified.
(1) The nuclear deal is an agreement between India and the US for the US government to supply nuclear fuel and reactors to India.
Contrary to common perception, the nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement is not a commitment on the part of the US government to provide us with uranium or nuclear reactors. Presently American law prohibits nuclear cooperation with India because we have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All the nuclear deal does is to grant a 'waiver' from that law, so that American companies can now pursue nuclear trade with India. However, if India conducts a test at any time, the waiver is revoked.
(2) Imported uranium and nuclear reactors will be cheap and cost-effective.
Even if the nuclear deal is made operational, the actual sale of uranium and nuclear reactors will be governed by market forces - there are no guarantees of cheap or competitive nuclear power. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it will be expensive. The cost of uranium in the international market has gone up four-fold in the last few years, and will rise further with further demand. The same is true of the cost of steel and other materials used in a reactor. Manpower costs are much higher in the West. The example of the Dhabol power plant has already shown us that importing power plants from the West is not necessarily a viable option. We would do well to learn from that experience.
(3) The nuclear deal will safeguard our energy security.
It is true that nuclear energy is green energy, and therefore essential for our long-term energy security. But this does not translate into the nuclear deal will ensure our energy security. Power from the nuclear reactors that we buy will definitely be more expensive than indigenous nuclear power. Further, to keep the reactors running, we will always be dependent on imported uranium, which is controlled by a cartel - the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore, the nuclear deal, by making us dependent on the cartel, will only compromise our energy security. Only our indigenous nuclear power programme can truly ensure our energy security. And in any case, for the next few decades, nuclear power will not exceed 6% of our total electricity production.
(4) Importing nuclear plants is a quick-fix solution to the present power crisis.
Nuclear technology is sensitive. Even if the nuclear deal goes through, it will take time to buy and setup new reactors. We have examples of the French reactors in China, and the Russian reactors in Kudankulam, India. It will actually take longer to setup foreign reactors compared to indigenous ones. Just the negotiations and legal formalities could take years. It will be at least eight years before we see the first power. So importing reactors is certainly no quick solution. For the short term, we will still have to rely on coal and hydroelectricity.
(5) The nuclear deal does not stop India from further nuclear testing, and therefore does not compromise our national security.
It is very clearly stated in the 123 Agreement it will be subject to national laws, and the Hyde Act is a law of the US. Therefore, the 123 Agreement is certainly circumscribed by the Hyde Act, which very clearly states that if India tests a nuclear device, all further nuclear trade is to stop, and the nuclear materials that have already been sold to us have to be returned. No future Indian government would dare to jeopardise such a huge investment in nuclear power, by testing. So, for all practical purposes the nuclear deal caps our strategic programme - which is precisely what the Americans intend.
(6) We can pass a national law to counteract the Hyde Act, and this will protect our strategic programme.
Just as the Hyde Act is not binding on us, our laws are not binding on the US. We can certainly amend our Atomic Energy Act to enable participation of the private sector in nuclear power. But if we pass a law saying that we will retain the right to test, it will have no influence on the actions of the US. If and when we test, they can simply quote the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act, and pull out all their nuclear materials, leaving us devastated. The only option here is to renegotiate the 123 Agreement and have the clause inserted there. However, the Americans are unlikely to agree to this, since it goes against their non-proliferation policy.
(7) The nuclear deal and the safeguards agreement give India the status of a nuclear power.
While the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement did indeed talk about India being treated as an equal by the US, neither the 123 Agreement nor the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, have borne out those optimistic statements. In fact, the IAEA safeguards agreement that has been negotiated is closely based on the model agreement that IAEA has for non-nuclear weapon states. The safeguards agreements that the nuclear weapon countries have signed with the IAEA require them to put very few reactors under safeguards, and allow them to take reactors out of safeguards. India, however, will have to place most of its reactors under safeguards for perpetuity. Therefore we are certainly not being treated as a nuclear weapons country.
(8) Without the nuclear deal, we cannot get adequate uranium for our domestic nuclear programme.
The Department of Atomic Energy has always maintained that we have enough indigenous uranium for 10,000 MW of nuclear power for 30 years. We are not yet close to that number. The present mismatch in uranium availability for operating reactors is a consequence of poor planning, and inadequate prospecting and mining. There is talk of importing 40,000 MW of nuclear power, which will cost not less than $100 billion or Rs. 4 lakh crores. If even 10% of this money were spent on uranium mining in existing mines in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, on searching for new uranium deposits, and negotiating with non-NSG countries, there will be enough uranium for a robust indigenous nuclear power programme, until such time as thorium reactors takes over.
(9) The safeguards agreement with the IAEA guarantees fuel supplies even if India conducts a nuclear test.
The safeguards agreement only notes, in the preamble, that India's concurrence to the safeguards is linked to getting fuel supplies. However, the IAEA has no role in this matter, and certainly, no such commitment is given in the safeguards agreement. It also notes that India may take 'corrective measures' in the event of a disruption of foreign fuel supplies. It does not specify what these measures will be, it does not provide for any role for the IAEA in this, and it does not bestow legitimacy on any such measures that India may take. It may well be that any such measures that we suggest, such as importing fuel from another country, will be disallowed by the nuclear cartel (the NSG). The only tangible corrective measure is for India to explore and mine more uranium, and to enhance the enrichment capability to provide fuel for those reactors. The latter is subject to uncertainty.
(10) The nuclear deal has no impact on our foreign policy.
The Hyde Act states clearly that it is the policy of the US to secure India's cooperation on a number of issues involving Iran, including its capability to reprocess nuclear fuel (in spite of the fact that Iran, as an NPT signatory, has the right to enrich uranium for use in light-water reactors). This has nothing to do with the nuclear deal, and can only be related to influencing our foreign policy. Recent statements by Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, regarding Indo-Iran gas pipeline, only add fuel to such suspicions.
It can therefore be seen, that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest. It presents the very serious danger of capping our strategic programme. That alone is reason enough not to go forward with the deal. Additionally, it does not guarantee the energy security that we are seeking, and, in fact, may only end up making us as vulnerable to the nuclear cartel, as we are today to the oil cartel.
It is easy to see why the US wants this deal so badly. At virtually no cost, since there is no commitment towards fuel supplies, they can cap our strategic programme, bring us into the NPT net, through the back door, as a non-nuclear power, keep a close eye on our nuclear activities, including R&D, through intrusive IAEA inspections, and subjugate us to the wishes of the nuclear cartel. If there were no cartel, we could have easily extended the Kudankulam agreement for more reactors, and avoided the present situation. If these are not reasons enough not to go ahead with the nuclear deal, then there are no reasons that reason can find.
news from the cpi(m)
Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal
P. K. Iyengar
Chairman (Retd.), Atomic Energy Commission
In spite of the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest, many in the country, and in Parliament, support it because of misconceptions about the deal, which need to be clarified.
(1) The nuclear deal is an agreement between India and the US for the US government to supply nuclear fuel and reactors to India.
Contrary to common perception, the nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement is not a commitment on the part of the US government to provide us with uranium or nuclear reactors. Presently American law prohibits nuclear cooperation with India because we have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All the nuclear deal does is to grant a 'waiver' from that law, so that American companies can now pursue nuclear trade with India. However, if India conducts a test at any time, the waiver is revoked.
(2) Imported uranium and nuclear reactors will be cheap and cost-effective.
Even if the nuclear deal is made operational, the actual sale of uranium and nuclear reactors will be governed by market forces - there are no guarantees of cheap or competitive nuclear power. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it will be expensive. The cost of uranium in the international market has gone up four-fold in the last few years, and will rise further with further demand. The same is true of the cost of steel and other materials used in a reactor. Manpower costs are much higher in the West. The example of the Dhabol power plant has already shown us that importing power plants from the West is not necessarily a viable option. We would do well to learn from that experience.
(3) The nuclear deal will safeguard our energy security.
It is true that nuclear energy is green energy, and therefore essential for our long-term energy security. But this does not translate into the nuclear deal will ensure our energy security. Power from the nuclear reactors that we buy will definitely be more expensive than indigenous nuclear power. Further, to keep the reactors running, we will always be dependent on imported uranium, which is controlled by a cartel - the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore, the nuclear deal, by making us dependent on the cartel, will only compromise our energy security. Only our indigenous nuclear power programme can truly ensure our energy security. And in any case, for the next few decades, nuclear power will not exceed 6% of our total electricity production.
(4) Importing nuclear plants is a quick-fix solution to the present power crisis.
Nuclear technology is sensitive. Even if the nuclear deal goes through, it will take time to buy and setup new reactors. We have examples of the French reactors in China, and the Russian reactors in Kudankulam, India. It will actually take longer to setup foreign reactors compared to indigenous ones. Just the negotiations and legal formalities could take years. It will be at least eight years before we see the first power. So importing reactors is certainly no quick solution. For the short term, we will still have to rely on coal and hydroelectricity.
(5) The nuclear deal does not stop India from further nuclear testing, and therefore does not compromise our national security.
It is very clearly stated in the 123 Agreement it will be subject to national laws, and the Hyde Act is a law of the US. Therefore, the 123 Agreement is certainly circumscribed by the Hyde Act, which very clearly states that if India tests a nuclear device, all further nuclear trade is to stop, and the nuclear materials that have already been sold to us have to be returned. No future Indian government would dare to jeopardise such a huge investment in nuclear power, by testing. So, for all practical purposes the nuclear deal caps our strategic programme - which is precisely what the Americans intend.
(6) We can pass a national law to counteract the Hyde Act, and this will protect our strategic programme.
Just as the Hyde Act is not binding on us, our laws are not binding on the US. We can certainly amend our Atomic Energy Act to enable participation of the private sector in nuclear power. But if we pass a law saying that we will retain the right to test, it will have no influence on the actions of the US. If and when we test, they can simply quote the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act, and pull out all their nuclear materials, leaving us devastated. The only option here is to renegotiate the 123 Agreement and have the clause inserted there. However, the Americans are unlikely to agree to this, since it goes against their non-proliferation policy.
(7) The nuclear deal and the safeguards agreement give India the status of a nuclear power.
While the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement did indeed talk about India being treated as an equal by the US, neither the 123 Agreement nor the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, have borne out those optimistic statements. In fact, the IAEA safeguards agreement that has been negotiated is closely based on the model agreement that IAEA has for non-nuclear weapon states. The safeguards agreements that the nuclear weapon countries have signed with the IAEA require them to put very few reactors under safeguards, and allow them to take reactors out of safeguards. India, however, will have to place most of its reactors under safeguards for perpetuity. Therefore we are certainly not being treated as a nuclear weapons country.
(8) Without the nuclear deal, we cannot get adequate uranium for our domestic nuclear programme.
The Department of Atomic Energy has always maintained that we have enough indigenous uranium for 10,000 MW of nuclear power for 30 years. We are not yet close to that number. The present mismatch in uranium availability for operating reactors is a consequence of poor planning, and inadequate prospecting and mining. There is talk of importing 40,000 MW of nuclear power, which will cost not less than $100 billion or Rs. 4 lakh crores. If even 10% of this money were spent on uranium mining in existing mines in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, on searching for new uranium deposits, and negotiating with non-NSG countries, there will be enough uranium for a robust indigenous nuclear power programme, until such time as thorium reactors takes over.
(9) The safeguards agreement with the IAEA guarantees fuel supplies even if India conducts a nuclear test.
The safeguards agreement only notes, in the preamble, that India's concurrence to the safeguards is linked to getting fuel supplies. However, the IAEA has no role in this matter, and certainly, no such commitment is given in the safeguards agreement. It also notes that India may take 'corrective measures' in the event of a disruption of foreign fuel supplies. It does not specify what these measures will be, it does not provide for any role for the IAEA in this, and it does not bestow legitimacy on any such measures that India may take. It may well be that any such measures that we suggest, such as importing fuel from another country, will be disallowed by the nuclear cartel (the NSG). The only tangible corrective measure is for India to explore and mine more uranium, and to enhance the enrichment capability to provide fuel for those reactors. The latter is subject to uncertainty.
(10) The nuclear deal has no impact on our foreign policy.
The Hyde Act states clearly that it is the policy of the US to secure India's cooperation on a number of issues involving Iran, including its capability to reprocess nuclear fuel (in spite of the fact that Iran, as an NPT signatory, has the right to enrich uranium for use in light-water reactors). This has nothing to do with the nuclear deal, and can only be related to influencing our foreign policy. Recent statements by Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, regarding Indo-Iran gas pipeline, only add fuel to such suspicions.
It can therefore be seen, that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest. It presents the very serious danger of capping our strategic programme. That alone is reason enough not to go forward with the deal. Additionally, it does not guarantee the energy security that we are seeking, and, in fact, may only end up making us as vulnerable to the nuclear cartel, as we are today to the oil cartel.
It is easy to see why the US wants this deal so badly. At virtually no cost, since there is no commitment towards fuel supplies, they can cap our strategic programme, bring us into the NPT net, through the back door, as a non-nuclear power, keep a close eye on our nuclear activities, including R&D, through intrusive IAEA inspections, and subjugate us to the wishes of the nuclear cartel. If there were no cartel, we could have easily extended the Kudankulam agreement for more reactors, and avoided the present situation. If these are not reasons enough not to go ahead with the nuclear deal, then there are no reasons that reason can find.
US/Indo Nuclear Agreement: Derailing A Deal
08 August, 2007 -- Nuclear-armed states are criminal states. They have a legal obligation, confirmed by the
On July 27,
Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, observes that the agreement doesn't bar further Indian nuclear testing and, "incredibly, ... commits
The Indo-US agreement is likely to prompt others to break the rules as well.
The Indo-US deal mixes military and commercial motives. Nuclear weapons specialist Gary Milhollin noted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's testimony to Congress that the agreement was "crafted with the private sector firmly in mind," particularly aircraft and reactors and, Milhollin stresses, military aircraft. By undermining the barriers against nuclear war, he adds, the agreement not only increases regional tensions but also "may hasten the day when a nuclear explosion destroys an American city."
Over the past few years,
The pipeline, and the hope it offers, might become a casualty of the Indo-US agreement, which
The Indo-US deal continues the pattern of
It is noteworthy that the great majority of Americans - and Iranians - favour converting the entire region to a nuclear-weapons free zone, including
Clearly, ways to mitigate current crises aren't lacking.
This Indo-US agreement richly deserves to be derailed. The threat of nuclear war is extremely serious, and growing, and part of the reason is that the nuclear states - led by the United States - simply refuse to live up to their obligations or are significantly violating them, this latest effort being another step toward disaster.
US/Indo Nuclear Agreement: Derailing A Deal
October 09, 2007 By Noam ChomskySources:http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/14261
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