Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal

marxistindia
news from the cpi(m)
Ten misconceptions about the nuclear deal

P. K. Iyengar
Chairman (Retd.), Atomic Energy Commission

In spite of the fact that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest, many in the country, and in Parliament, support it because of misconceptions about the deal, which need to be clarified.

(1) The nuclear deal is an agreement between India and the US for the US government to supply nuclear fuel and reactors to India.

Contrary to common perception, the nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement is not a commitment on the part of the US government to provide us with uranium or nuclear reactors. Presently American law prohibits nuclear cooperation with India because we have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). All the nuclear deal does is to grant a 'waiver' from that law, so that American companies can now pursue nuclear trade with India. However, if India conducts a test at any time, the waiver is revoked.

(2) Imported uranium and nuclear reactors will be cheap and cost-effective.

Even if the nuclear deal is made operational, the actual sale of uranium and nuclear reactors will be governed by market forces - there are no guarantees of cheap or competitive nuclear power. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it will be expensive. The cost of uranium in the international market has gone up four-fold in the last few years, and will rise further with further demand. The same is true of the cost of steel and other materials used in a reactor. Manpower costs are much higher in the West. The example of the Dhabol power plant has already shown us that importing power plants from the West is not necessarily a viable option. We would do well to learn from that experience.

(3) The nuclear deal will safeguard our energy security.

It is true that nuclear energy is green energy, and therefore essential for our long-term energy security. But this does not translate into the nuclear deal will ensure our energy security. Power from the nuclear reactors that we buy will definitely be more expensive than indigenous nuclear power. Further, to keep the reactors running, we will always be dependent on imported uranium, which is controlled by a cartel - the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Therefore, the nuclear deal, by making us dependent on the cartel, will only compromise our energy security. Only our indigenous nuclear power programme can truly ensure our energy security. And in any case, for the next few decades, nuclear power will not exceed 6% of our total electricity production.

(4) Importing nuclear plants is a quick-fix solution to the present power crisis.

Nuclear technology is sensitive. Even if the nuclear deal goes through, it will take time to buy and setup new reactors. We have examples of the French reactors in China, and the Russian reactors in Kudankulam, India. It will actually take longer to setup foreign reactors compared to indigenous ones. Just the negotiations and legal formalities could take years. It will be at least eight years before we see the first power. So importing reactors is certainly no quick solution. For the short term, we will still have to rely on coal and hydroelectricity.


(5) The nuclear deal does not stop India from further nuclear testing, and therefore does not compromise our national security.

It is very clearly stated in the 123 Agreement it will be subject to national laws, and the Hyde Act is a law of the US. Therefore, the 123 Agreement is certainly circumscribed by the Hyde Act, which very clearly states that if India tests a nuclear device, all further nuclear trade is to stop, and the nuclear materials that have already been sold to us have to be returned. No future Indian government would dare to jeopardise such a huge investment in nuclear power, by testing. So, for all practical purposes the nuclear deal caps our strategic programme - which is precisely what the Americans intend.

(6) We can pass a national law to counteract the Hyde Act, and this will protect our strategic programme.

Just as the Hyde Act is not binding on us, our laws are not binding on the US. We can certainly amend our Atomic Energy Act to enable participation of the private sector in nuclear power. But if we pass a law saying that we will retain the right to test, it will have no influence on the actions of the US. If and when we test, they can simply quote the 123 Agreement and the Hyde Act, and pull out all their nuclear materials, leaving us devastated. The only option here is to renegotiate the 123 Agreement and have the clause inserted there. However, the Americans are unlikely to agree to this, since it goes against their non-proliferation policy.

(7) The nuclear deal and the safeguards agreement give India the status of a nuclear power.

While the 18 July 2005 Joint Statement did indeed talk about India being treated as an equal by the US, neither the 123 Agreement nor the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, have borne out those optimistic statements. In fact, the IAEA safeguards agreement that has been negotiated is closely based on the model agreement that IAEA has for non-nuclear weapon states. The safeguards agreements that the nuclear weapon countries have signed with the IAEA require them to put very few reactors under safeguards, and allow them to take reactors out of safeguards. India, however, will have to place most of its reactors under safeguards for perpetuity. Therefore we are certainly not being treated as a nuclear weapons country.

(8) Without the nuclear deal, we cannot get adequate uranium for our domestic nuclear programme.

The Department of Atomic Energy has always maintained that we have enough indigenous uranium for 10,000 MW of nuclear power for 30 years. We are not yet close to that number. The present mismatch in uranium availability for operating reactors is a consequence of poor planning, and inadequate prospecting and mining. There is talk of importing 40,000 MW of nuclear power, which will cost not less than $100 billion or Rs. 4 lakh crores. If even 10% of this money were spent on uranium mining in existing mines in Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, on searching for new uranium deposits, and negotiating with non-NSG countries, there will be enough uranium for a robust indigenous nuclear power programme, until such time as thorium reactors takes over.


(9) The safeguards agreement with the IAEA guarantees fuel supplies even if India conducts a nuclear test.

The safeguards agreement only notes, in the preamble, that India's concurrence to the safeguards is linked to getting fuel supplies. However, the IAEA has no role in this matter, and certainly, no such commitment is given in the safeguards agreement. It also notes that India may take 'corrective measures' in the event of a disruption of foreign fuel supplies. It does not specify what these measures will be, it does not provide for any role for the IAEA in this, and it does not bestow legitimacy on any such measures that India may take. It may well be that any such measures that we suggest, such as importing fuel from another country, will be disallowed by the nuclear cartel (the NSG). The only tangible corrective measure is for India to explore and mine more uranium, and to enhance the enrichment capability to provide fuel for those reactors. The latter is subject to uncertainty.

(10) The nuclear deal has no impact on our foreign policy.

The Hyde Act states clearly that it is the policy of the US to secure India's cooperation on a number of issues involving Iran, including its capability to reprocess nuclear fuel (in spite of the fact that Iran, as an NPT signatory, has the right to enrich uranium for use in light-water reactors). This has nothing to do with the nuclear deal, and can only be related to influencing our foreign policy. Recent statements by Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, regarding Indo-Iran gas pipeline, only add fuel to such suspicions.

It can therefore be seen, that the Indo-US nuclear deal is not in the national interest. It presents the very serious danger of capping our strategic programme. That alone is reason enough not to go forward with the deal. Additionally, it does not guarantee the energy security that we are seeking, and, in fact, may only end up making us as vulnerable to the nuclear cartel, as we are today to the oil cartel.

It is easy to see why the US wants this deal so badly. At virtually no cost, since there is no commitment towards fuel supplies, they can cap our strategic programme, bring us into the NPT net, through the back door, as a non-nuclear power, keep a close eye on our nuclear activities, including R&D, through intrusive IAEA inspections, and subjugate us to the wishes of the nuclear cartel. If there were no cartel, we could have easily extended the Kudankulam agreement for more reactors, and avoided the present situation. If these are not reasons enough not to go ahead with the nuclear deal, then there are no reasons that reason can find.

US/Indo Nuclear Agreement: Derailing A Deal

08 August, 2007 -- Nuclear-armed states are criminal states. They have a legal obligation, confirmed by the World Court, to live up to Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which calls on them to carry out good-faith negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. None of the nuclear states has lived up to it. The United States is a leading violator, especially the Bush administration, which even has stated that it isn't subject to Article 6.

On July 27, Washington entered into an agreement with India that guts the central part of the NPT, though there remains substantial opposition in both countries. India, like Israel and Pakistan (but unlike Iran), is not an NPT signatory, and has developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty. With this new agreement, the Bush administration effectively endorses and facilitates this outlaw behaviour. The agreement violates US law, and bypasses the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 45 nations that have established strict rules to lessen the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Â

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, observes that the agreement doesn't bar further Indian nuclear testing and, "incredibly, ... commits Washington to help New Delhi secure fuel supplies from other countries even if India resumes testing." It also permits India to "free up its limited domestic supplies for bomb production." All these steps are in direct violation of international nonproliferation agreements.

Â

The Indo-US agreement is likely to prompt others to break the rules as well. Pakistan is reported to be building a plutonium production reactor for nuclear weapons, apparently beginning a more advanced phase of weapons design. Israel, the regional nuclear superpower, has been lobbying Congress for privileges similar to India's, and has approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group with requests for exemption from its rules. Now France, Russia and Australia have moved to pursue nuclear deals with India, as China has with Pakistan - hardly a surprise, once the global superpower has opened the door.

Â

The Indo-US deal mixes military and commercial motives. Nuclear weapons specialist Gary Milhollin noted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's testimony to Congress that the agreement was "crafted with the private sector firmly in mind," particularly aircraft and reactors and, Milhollin stresses, military aircraft. By undermining the barriers against nuclear war, he adds, the agreement not only increases regional tensions but also "may hasten the day when a nuclear explosion destroys an American city." Washington's message is that "export controls are less important to the United States than money" - that is, profits for US corporations - whatever the potential threat. Kimball points out that the United States is granting India "terms of nuclear trade more favourable than those for states that have assumed all the obligations and responsibilities" of the NPT. In most of the world, few can fail to see the cynicism. Washington rewards allies and clients that ignore the NPT rules entirely, while threatening war against Iran, which is not known to have violated the NPT, despite extreme provocation: The United States has occupied two of Iran's neighbours and openly sought to overthrow the Iranian regime since it broke free of US control in 1979.

Â

Over the past few years, India and Pakistan have made strides towards easing the tensions between the two countries. People-to-people contacts have increased and the governments are in discussion over the many outstanding issues that divide the two states. Those promising developments may well be reversed by the Indo-US nuclear deal. One of the means to build confidence throughout the region was the creation of a natural gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan into India. The "peace pipeline" would have tied the region together and opened the possibilities for further peaceful integration.

Â

The pipeline, and the hope it offers, might become a casualty of the Indo-US agreement, which Washington sees as a measure to isolate its Iranian enemy by offering India nuclear power in exchange for Iranian gas - though in fact India would gain only a fraction of what Iran could provide.

Â

The Indo-US deal continues the pattern of Washington's taking every measure to isolate Iran. In 2006, the US Congress passed the Hyde Act, which specifically demanded that the US government "secure India's full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction."

Â

It is noteworthy that the great majority of Americans - and Iranians - favour converting the entire region to a nuclear-weapons free zone, including Iran and Israel. One may also recall that UN Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, to which Washington regularly appealed when seeking justification for its invasion of Iraq, calls for "establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery."

Â

Clearly, ways to mitigate current crises aren't lacking.

Â

This Indo-US agreement richly deserves to be derailed. The threat of nuclear war is extremely serious, and growing, and part of the reason is that the nuclear states - led by the United States - simply refuse to live up to their obligations or are significantly violating them, this latest effort being another step toward disaster.

Â

The US Congress gets a chance to weigh in on this deal after the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group vet it. Perhaps Congress, reflecting a citizenry fed up with nuclear gamesmanship, can reject the agreement. A better way to go forward is to pursue the need for global nuclear disarmament, recognising that the very survival of the species is at stake.

US/Indo Nuclear Agreement: Derailing A Deal

October 09, 2007 By Noam Chomsky

Sources:http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/14261

Lal Sallam.

But the victory comes with a tarnished tag. Corruption may be a routine affair for Indians, but what the country witnessed these last few days crossed all limits of decorum. To get the numbers right, most parties, barring the Left and a handful of others , resorted to dishonourable ways.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/23upavote3.htm

bampothira bikri hoye jai na, nitir sathe aposh kore na, abar ta promanito holo.


nije ekjon bamponthi bole ajj khub bhalo lagche.

Kara Subidhabadi????

UP te samprodayik shaktir birodhitar disha dekhyechilo SP ajj tara tader oi bhavmurty nijerai nosto korche. je SP borabor N deal er birodhita kore gelo tarai kono jadu montre hothat N deal ke bhalo chokhe dekhte suru korlo??? bokar moton SP neta charidike bole berachhen N deal niye desher kono bipod nei, mushalmander kono bipod nei, mushalman der naki jeta bipod seta holo BJP. othocho etai lokhyanio SP adhvanir pothei bharot matkin jot chaichen.

r amader poschimbonger birodhi netri ki korchen?? mukhe bolchen uni naki BJP ebong Congress theke somo durawta niti niye cholchen othocho mojar kotha holo uni kintu NDA ekhono charen ni. goto kal star anonder ekti anusthane ese tmc ek neta (sougata roy) poriskar bole dilen onara desher rajniti/sartha niye motei chintito non.onader lakhya holo writers theke Budhha babu ke sorano. koto subidhabaj amader ei birodhi ra jekhane desh ta bikri hoye jawar jogar sekhane amader birodhi netri oi sob na dekhe ba shune poschim bonge komotai asar diba swapno dekhchen.

R amader kendrio sorkar ba congressi ra to mukhe sob tik ache bole puro rat jege katachhe ki vave 271 ta vote jogar kora jai tar chinta kore. JMM ke oti koste kinte pereche tara kintu tar bodole JMM ja dabi korche Dr.Sing ta kotota rakhte parbe ta niye probol sondeho theke jachhe.JMM caiche koila montrok jeta sibu soren ke dite amader prime min. anichhuk. sudhu tai noi 5 koti takar ekta package o cheyechen guruji. jeta naki rajyer unnatir(!!!!) sarthe khorcha kora hobe, ekhaneo sesh noi amader rajyer o biharer kichuta uni niye nite chan aro brihottoro jharkhand rajyo banaor jonyo.

edike N deal niye amader kendriyo sorkar jokhon basto tokhon bivvinyo rajyo theke tathyer vittite kendriyo krishi montrok krishok der antmohatyar je porisonkhyan tairy koreche ta otontyo bedonadayok. ei muhurte sara desher modhye krishokder antmyohatyar porisonkhyai karnatak sob cheye egiye , unfortunately jekhane sashok sreni holo bjp. goto 6 bochore karnatoke 8,600 krishok antmyohata korechen.tarpore ache andhraprodesh sekhane mara gechen pray 2000 jon r tritio sthane ache moharastro sekhane 2001 theke 06 sale mara geche 891 jon krishok. pasapasi besorkari sutre jana geche bidhorve goto choi mase antmyogathi hoyeche pray 600 jon krishok. ei number guli ki amader PM ektu chok buliye dekhechen??? uttor holo na , karon uni je ekhon different number game niye basto onar priyo number ekhon holo 271, jeta ke pawar jonyo uni lorchen, namiyediyechen boro boro corporate der, ekoda onar tibro somolachona kaki Amar singh ke. dhikkar janai ei sorkar ke jara desher manusher kotha vule giye bairer desher chamcha hote uthe pore legeche.

Keno N deal r birodhita???

4O bochorer chuktite amara pormanu bidyut pabo matro 4%. sundor bisleshon korechen kolkata biswabidyaloyer rosayoner adhyapok Shyamal Chakroborty.

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/16/cache/171384.jpg

U 238 ke plutonium 239 kora jai. tarpore thorium 232 ke plutonium theke berono kona diye dhakka mere U 233 kora jai. ei U 233 r jalani gun U 235 er theke onek besi. BARC er bigyani ra ei kaj onek gutiye enechen tao????

Pormanu chukti niye birodhita keno???

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/18/cache/171627.jpg

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/17/cache/171541.jpg

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/16/cache/171470.jpg

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/15/cache/171337.jpg

Pormanu chukti niye birodhita keno???

jekhane sara biswa pormanu biduyt theke sore asche sekhane amader desh eto poromanu biduyt niye matamati korche?? prosho tulechen Saha Instituter bigyani Prof. Raj Kumar Maitra.

http://bangla.ganashakti.co.in/patrika/2008/7/17/cache/171559.jpg